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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the problem of order
through an analysis of individual practices of security.
Because security is a multi-dimensional issue, no unified
perspective currently exists to explain security practices.
Based on my analysis of data from a detailed survey of 137
residents of a Baton Rouge neighborhood, I argue that there
are three main dimensions of security and each has a unique
set of determinants, since individuals are contextually
situated in their households, neighborhoods, and
municipalities.
This dissertation examines variables related to
psychological,

stratification, social network, and rational

choice perspectives.

The analysis demonstrates that

although factors suggested by each of these perspectives
contribute to an explanation of security, no one factor
explains security-related behaviors at all levels.
I argue that citizens vary in the types of actions
they take to provide security because of differential
levels of trust in different agents to provide the
necessary services.

Some trust their own abilities to

provide security for themselves, some trust neighborhood
programs, and some trust the government to provide
security.

Because trust is a key issue in understanding
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security,

I propose that future research on security

acknowledge the importance of trust.

I suggest that part

of the failure of the rational choice perspective to
present a unified explanation of security is that it does
not properly understand self interest.

The rational choice

perspective should acknowledge the relationships between
trust and security, and trust and order.
Fear of crime is significantly related to individuals'
personal avoidance measures.

Association with neighbors is

related to taking fewer protectivemeasures in and around
the home.

I offer no explanation of support for

contributions to the community crime-prevention
organization.

Trust in local government, educational

attainment, and tax liability explains support for the tax
millages.

XI
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The Problem

Sociologists have long been concerned with the
"problem of order."

Turner (1985) noted that classical

theorists dating back to Herbert Spencer were concerned
with micro processes in society which sustain the
institutional order and achieve societal equilibrium.

The

problem of order, as classically conceived, deals with the
question of how diverse interests and actors can be
reconciled and integrated into a social whole.

This

problem gives rise to questions of social control and
deviance, the place where abstract social theory meets
pragmatic questions from the everyday life of individuals.
In short, che problem of order writ small is the problem of
security for people.
The central question of this dissertation is: What are
the dimensions and determinants of security?

I introduce

the concept of security as the need for freedom from
suffering personal or property damage or loss.

Although

Americans continuously rate security as a primary societal
need (Miller, Tsemberis, Malia, and Grega, 1980; Farah,
Barnes, and Heunk, 1979), little work has been done to
study the rapid growth and change in types of security
concerns and practices.

Various types of security can be
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purchased.

Moore and Trojanowicz (1988) state that

"...

one of the most important privileges one acquires as one
gains wealth and status in American society is the
opportunity to leave the fear of crime behind" (p.2).
Ninety-five percent of Americans take some type of
preventive security measure (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981}.
However, although there is uniform agreement on the need
for security, citizens differ in the way in which they
address this need.
The social scientific community has also addressed the
problem of security, but without any unified approach to
understanding the issue.

To begin to fill this gap, I

first attempt to conceptualize security on a continuum from
micro to macro.-

Decisions on adoption of practices

related to security are made at the individual/household
level, neighborhood level, and municipal level.

I attempt

to explore the relationships among these three levels by
asking whether security practices are complementary or
substitutional among them.

" There is a great deal of disagreement among social
scientists in defining micro, meso, and macro units of
analysis.
In her American Sociological Association
Presidential Address, Joan Huber (1990) noted that the only
agreement about definitions in micro and macro is that
micro means small.
It must be understood that micro, meso,
and macro are relative terms and levels of analysis used in
this study are simply labels attached to areas of different
geographic scope.
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This dissertation attempts to achieve a better
understanding of the relationships among and adoption of
security practices.

Because appropriate levels of security

and prices that are willing to be paid cannot be clearly
defined by citizens, collectivities, or government
officials, security is not provided through an efficient
market process.
This dissertation investigates influences on
individual actions related to security.

It will be shown

that there are different influences on practices related to
micro, meso, and macro levels of security.

Adoption of

practices related to security is influenced by an
individual's fear of crime, social status, and social
network context.
In this chapter, the idea of security will be
explored.

I present a three-level approach in which

individuals may provide, or cooperate with others to
provide security for themselves, their family members,
their neighbors, and fellow citizens.

Second, I review

three approaches that have been used to explain securityrelated behaviors: psychological, stratification, and
social network.

Each of these approaches has something to

offer in explaining security behavior, but each also falls
short of offering a unified and empirically testable
explanation of behavior at micro, meso, and macro levels.
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Next, the current status of rational choice theory is
reviewed and applied to the provision of security.
Levels of Security

Humans are expected to place their greatest energies
in fulfilling their most basic needs before they can focus
on other needs (Maslow, 1954).

Inglehart [1911) draws on

the ideas of Maslow to present security as a highly valued
need which comes after fulfillment of the most basic
physiological and sustenance needs.
Part of the lack of a unified understanding of
security comes from the diverse ways in which securityrelated behaviors have been studied.

Protection in and

around the home has been considered a very high priority
(Warr and Stafford,

1983) .

This form of security has been,

studied in terms of spatial, temporal, and situational
avoidance measures

{DuBow, McCabe, and Kaplan, 1979),

individual protective measures such as gun ownership
(Wright, Rossi, and Daly, 1983), and household measures
such as installing alarm systems or deadbolt locks (Skogan
and Maxfield, 1981; Lavrakas et al., 1981; DuBow et al.,
1979).
Most communities monitor and exclude "outsiders"
through informal processes

(Suttles, 1968; 1972).

Some
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neighborhoods may also organize formally to watch
neighbors' homes and look out for "suspicious activities"
(Lindsay and McGillis, 1986; Lewis, Grant, and Rosenbaum,
1988; Rosenbaum, 1987; Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981).

Other

communities collect money to hire supplemental policing
(private security guards or extra-duty police or deputies).
Law enforcement agencies provide services used by all
citizens in the metropolitan area.

Though individuals must

comply with the local laws and do not influence directly
the local criminal justice agents, citizens are given a
voice in government through electing representatives and
voting for or against tax referenda that may affect the
budget of the criminal justice system.This dissertation introduces the idea of categorizing
these dimensions into micro-level measures that take place
in and around the home, meso-level measures that take place

- Louisiana politics have a long history of populism and of
offering a very low tax burden for medium to lower income
residents.
One popular law which keeps property taxes low
is the Homestead Exemption, under which any residence which
is assessed at or below $ 75,000 is exempt from all parish
property taxes.
This exemption, together with property tax
rates creates a unique tax structure. Of the 100 largest
metropolitan areas in the United States, Baton Rouge had
the lowest property tax assessment for comparable homes.
The Baton Rouge tax rate was approximately one-fifteenth
that of the area with the highest tax liability (Long
Island, New York) and one-sixth that of the national median
(Smith, 1993) .
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around the neighborhood, and macro-level measures that are
provided by the municipal government.Micro-Level Security
Most social scientific research on security practices
has been carried out at the household level (DuBow, McCabe,
and Kaplan,
1978).

1979; Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo,

Some of this research emphasis is based upon the

belief that individuals are most concerned about defending
their own homes (Warr and Stafford, 1983).

Most studies

have focused on the direct relationship between fear of
crime’ and various precautionary and protective measures
that are affected indirectly by ascribed and achieved
characteristics such as socioeconomic status, age, and sex
(DuBow et al., 1979; Skogan and Maxfield,
Warr and Stafford,

1981; Warr, 1990;

1983) .

■ Security is also a matter for larger political units such
as nations, but the study of international security calls
for a different approach. I will not address international
security in this dissertation.
’ Fear of crime captures both perceived risk of being a
victim and severity of offense. Warr and Stafford (1983)
showed that individuals' highest fear was for property
offenses. Respondents were more likely to be afraid of
having their homes burgled while they are away than at
home. While violent crime has more severe consequences,
people are significantly more likely to become victims of
property crime.
Perceived risk plays a part in fear. Warr
(1990) found that altruistic fear leads to an increased
likelihood of gun ownership, but does not lead to a greater
likelihood of taking other household level security
precautions (Warr, 1990) . This study focuses primarily on
the respondents' personal fear of crime.
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At the personal household (micro) level, several types
of security precautions can be taken.

People participate

in such avoidance behaviors as: avoiding going out alone or
at night, avoiding certain places in the city, and refusing
to answer the door.

Individual/household protective

actions may include: installing security fences or alarms,
installing door locks and chains, installing window locks,
installing outdoor lighting, purchasing a dog for
protection, owning a gun for protection, and leaving
lights, televisions, or radios on when they go out.
Meso- and Macro-Level Security
Hunter (1985) stated that "to focus solely upon the
household, the dwelling, or similar micro-level physical
units is to miss this important, more expansive spatial
characteristic of the private social order... private order
is to be studied as an interaction between private and
public orders"

(p.235).

Understanding individual-level

security practices provides only a partial explanation of
the other kinds of practices related to security.

At the

meso and macro levels we deal with a public goods problem.
Still, security at meso and macro levels may be examined in
terms of the ways that individuals contribute to collective
enterprises.
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At the neighborhood (meso) level, organizations often
carry out the business of governing and providing
collective services (Crenson, 1983).

As with some forms of

household protection, individuals can participate in
security measures that cost little, such as watching
neighbors' homes for suspicious activities.

More

important, neighborhoods organize to form neighborhood
groups that are supported or funded through residents'
contributions.

These may provide private patrols or

residents themselves may actively protect the community
through citizen watches and patrols.
At the municipal (macro) level, the state provides a
justice system with police, courts, and prisons.

Although

taxpayers are not given a choice of whether or not they
will pay taxes, they do have a voice in governmental
decisions through such mechanisms as tax referenda (Hahn
and Kamieniecki,

1987).

The state provides a criminal

justice system with laws and police.

Because the

government is the primary provider of public goods,
influencing the government is essential in all collective
consumption issues.

Both the benefit and cost of policing

are shared by all taxpaying citizens, with several
organized interests competing for public benefits
(Castells, 1977, 1983; Rich, 1982a, 1982b) and the
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redistribution of the tax burden (Peterson,

1981; Lo,

1990; Hahn and Kamieneki, 1987).
Although security is a nearly universally valued good,
taking action at one level has no necessary or obvious
relation with taking actions at other levels.

I will argue

that no one single factor explains participation in
security behaviors at all levels, and that influences on
support for one type of security do not predict support at
other levels.

Meso and macro levels of security differ

from the individual level because they involve goods made
available through collective rather than individual action.
Meso and macro issues also differ in the types and amounts
of legitimate formal coercion that can be used by the
collectivity.
The Free Rider Problem

For many years, social scientists have been
preoccupied with the free rider problem for public goods.
Coleman (1990a) defines this problem in two parts: first,
many goods cannot be provided without a collective
contribution and second, individuals have no incentive to
contribute to the provision of collective goods unless they
are sanctioned by the collective.

By definition, a public

good is one whose benefits are non-excludable; because
selective incentives are in many cases unavailable in
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public goods, all individuals receive the benefit.

Also,

it is clear that some people benefit more than others.
Some people receive latent rewards, or make use of the
benefit more than others.
One of the primary questions that rational choice
theory must address is "to what extent will people
contribute to public goods?"

One rational choice

explanation is that people base their decisions on their
overall costs and benefits (Homans, 1951; Coleman,
Blau,

1954).

1990a;

Olson (1955) pointed out that through a

simple cost-benefit analysis, the most rational action for
individuals is not to contribute and to simply receive the
benefit cost-free rather than contributing to the costs of
public goods, hence the term "free rider."

If the good is

provided by the collective, individuals may be able to
receive the service without contributing.

This action

maximizes their "profit," and seems to encourage free
riding.

Free riding appears to pay off.

Of course, if a

significant number of community members did not contribute,
no public good would ever be provided.
I argue that the problem of public goods differs at
meso and macro levels.

At the meso level, communities

offer a different set of incentives and sanctions for
participation and free riding than those offered at the
macro level.

At the meso level, many communities lack
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formal sanctioning structures but have different capacities
to sanction members informally.

At the macro level, the

state offers citizens the right to vote and to voice
opinions on political issues, but requires compliance with
laws.
Various explanations of public goods provision have
been provided.

Hechter (1987) argues that individual

contributions to groups are made because members are
frequently motivated by "benefitting when the group
benefits."

Therefore, understanding group solidarity is

important to understanding the provision of public goods.
Coleman (1990a) argued that individuals receive "psychic
benefits" when their actions are similar to those of their
peers.
Recent literature has documented the growth of
collective, non-governmental organizations designed to
reduce crime (Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981; Lewis, Grant, and
Rosenbaum,

1988).

Rich (1980, p . 571) explained the

production of security at the neighborhood level and the
free rider problem that this kind of collective action
faces :
No single citizen is likely to be able to reduce
crime in a neighborhood by individual effort. If
a number of residents cooperate in a successful
crime prevention program, however, all residents
will reap the benefit of the collective good
produced by their efforts (a reduced risk of
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victimization) regardless of whether or not they
took part in the program.
I will address the problem of security as both an
individual action and collective goods issue.

Adoption of

security practices and support for security measures is
influenced through a complex process of individual need
fulfillment and social forces.
Approaches to Understanding Security

In this second section,

I outline three approaches

that have been used to explain human behavior.

These

approaches are not mutually exclusive and empirical support
for one approach is not necessarily inconsistent with
support for others.

Each approach attempts to explain

security behaviors at the micro, meso, and macro levels.
Each partially succeeds and partially fails in accounting
for the problem of understanding security provision.
The Psychological Approach
The psychological approach assumes that individuals
act in their own self interest, often disregarding the
welfare of others.

Social order takes place through an

"invisible hand" in which goods valued by the individual
aid society and goods valued by society aid individuals.
Because individuals act in their own self-interest,
regardless of the surrounding circumstances, there is no
need to study common values or patterns of relations with
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others in order to understand their actions.

Societal

action is the aggregate of all individual actions.
The psychological approach accounts for the adoption
of security behavior by arguing that these actions promote
individual psychological well being.

The study of fear of

crime presents a paradox in that those most fearful are
often the least likely to be victimized (Lewis and Salem,
1985; DuBow et al., 1979).

The dependent dimension in this

study is not fear, but rather actions taken to provide
security.

But there is a link between these two phenomena:

Fear motivates individuals to take precautionary behaviors
that lower their risk of becoming crime victims (Moore and
Trojanowicz,

1988).

Those with the highest levels of

personal fear are most likely to take avoidance behaviors
(Warr, 1984; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).
However, research on protective actions (specifically,
gun ownership) has produced mixed findings.

Wright, Rossi,

and Daly (1983), and Delmas and Bankston (1993) found no
relationship between fear of crime and gun ownership.

But

Smith and Uchida (1988) and Warr (1992) found a significant
relationship between fear of crime and purchasing a gun for
protection.=

Studies of the relationship between fear of

crime and adoption of other types of protective measures
= Warr (1992) found no relationship between fear for others
and protective measures, except for gun ownership.
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have also produced mixed findings (DuBow, McCabe, and
Kaplan, 1979) .
Attitudes such as trust in local government and racial
beliefs influence human behavior, especially at the
political level (Key, 1949; Carmines and Stimson, 1989).
However, until recently, social scientific literature has
generally neglected the linkage between governmental trust
and electoral support for crime issues, and the race-crimeelectoral behavior relationship.
Criticism of the Psychological Approach
One major deficiency of the psychological perspective
is that it provides an explanation of security measures
only at the household (micro) level.

Household-level

security is only one aspect of the general puzzle of how
people address their security concerns.

At the meso and

macro levels we deal with a public goods problem.

From

time to time, some people defy what appears to be their own
best interest, refrain from free riding, and act in an
altruistic manner.

Communities most fearful of crime are

not more likely to take on several types of neighborhoodlevel security measures

(Lavrakas et al., 1981), nor are

they more likely to vote for higher taxes to expand the
criminal justice system (Hahn and Kamieniecki, 1987) .
Attitudes do affect electoral behavior, but discovering the
most salient attitudes opens up a new series of debates.
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The Stratification Approach
Stratification theory has been used as a response to
the problem of social order.

Cultural distinctions and

environmental conditions create opportunities and
constraints for actors' behavior.

Ascribed and achieved

statuses affect individuals' access to resources, and also
impose constraints on social action.
Two statuses that are believed to affect citizen's
adoption of security measures are socioeconomic status
(Lavrakas et al, 1981) and life course stage (Knoke and
Thomson, 1977} .

Individuals in these situations are

expected to develop certain beliefs and act in certain
ways.
Marx claimed that patterns of stratification lead to
formation of solidary groups forming a collective class
conscience that expresses constraint.

People residing in

individual neighborhoods are likely to share similar
socioeconomic status.

The combination of sharing

residential location and social class has led to
expectations that these people have similar interests on a
number of issues

(Logan and Molotch,

1987; Lo, 1990).

Crime is a political issue in the sense that the issue
has symbolic and instrumental aspects.

Symbolic politics

is concerned with status and public affirmations that a
particular group is right or morally correct (Gusfield,
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1963).

Class-based groups not only share common interests,

but also form they form coalitions that struggle against
outgroup members for the control and benefits of public
resources (Castells, 1977).

Because public goods lead to

competition for resources, race and socioeconomic status
have been noted as key factors in electoral politics
dealing with the distribution of resources (Carmines and
Stimson,

1989).

Hahn and Kamienecki express the view that

"while high status voters may be willing to utilize their
resources to support local services in the communities in
which they live, they apparently are not prepared to
subsidize the disadvantaged"

(1987, p.124).

Race is a status variable.

Research has shown that

fear of crime decreases for whites as their level of
neighborhood racial segregation increases.

Liska,

Lawrence, and Sanchirico (1982) explain this relationship
by noting crime between culturally dissimilar people is
more threatening and fear-producing than crime between
culturally similar people.

It is associated with greater

uncertainty, unpredictability, and danger than intraracial
crime.

Therefore, people pay a premium to live in all

white neighborhoods and avoid interaction with blacks
(Smith, 1982).
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Criticism of the Stratification Approach
The stratification approach has been criticized on
three primary grounds.

First of all, although status may

explain why actors share similar constraints, some actors
deviate from expected behaviors.

Many theorists assume

similar constraints for all actors in a particular group,
but some actors facing similar structural constraints, with
similar access to information, develop different attitudes
and behavior.

Another criticism of stratification analysis

is that if shared structural conditions lead to behavior,
why does collective action not occur more often?

Free

riders still exist even though actors face similar
constraints within the structure.

A third criticism is

that models of collective action often take constraints as
fixed for all actors in empirical settings

(Ostrum, 1990).

The stratification approach does not account for different
values among all actors in the system and aggregates with
similar characteristics often act differentially.

For

example, there is a great deal of variability in the
actions of white middle class American groups.
The Social Network Approach
The concept of social structure separates sociology
from other fields of behavioral analysis
Berkowitz,

1988) .

(Wellman and

The social network approach to

structure was created as a response to the ideas in basic
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psychological and economic theories that society is the
product of actors behaving in their own self interest.
Social networks may be analyzed in order to understand how
actors choices and constraints grow out of and are
influenced by relations with others.
Earlier concepts of norm-driven behavior and
"internalization of norms" offered little explanatory
power.

Social network analysts measure the structure of

social networks and use that structure, rather than the
internalized drives and motivations of individuals, to
explain social action.

Proponents of this perspective

argue that the structure of social networks both
facilitates and constrains social action.

Social structure

also affects the formation of social networks.

Demographic

and social structures affect individuals' opportunities for
individuals to develop relationships with others
1977; McPherson,

1981) .

(Blau,

For example, network structure has

been shown to vary by such characteristics as gender
{Moore, 1990) , race (Marsden, 1977), and marital status
(Hurlbert and Acock, 1989).
The social network approach to the problem of security
stresses that the characteristics of the social network in
which an actor is embedded affect the types of security
measures that he or she takes.

Those actors who have

denser networks are more likely to be influenced by their
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close associates and will be more likely to adopt the
structurally prescribed behavior.

Individuals interacting

most frequently with neighbors are more likely to be
influenced through conversations and interaction (Coleman,
1990a).

They face a potential for greater social pressure

(subject themselves to meaningful sanctions) to act in the
culturally proscribed and prescribed manners (Hechter,
1987).

At the meso and macro levels, actors possessing

allegiance to a group (Coleman, 1990a;

Coleman, Katz, and

Menzel, 1966) or sharing equivalent positions in society's
structure

(Burt, 1987) are expected to participate in more

"pro-group" behavior.
Granovetter's (1962) "strength of weak ties" thesis
argues that in areas which have higher proportion of weak
ties (e.g. friends of friends, acquaintances) rather than
strong ties (e.g. close friends, relatives), information
will diffuse more rapidly.

This argument may point to a

mechanism that explains why some neighborhoods take
security actions and others fail to do so; Some residents
may not know about the existence of neighborhood-level
security actions.

Other residents may not believe that the

neighborhood-level actions provide sufficient benefits to
justify the cost of their individual contributions.
Comparing isolates and non-isolates in a system,
Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966) showed that ideas are
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adopted by actors who are more embedded in the social
system.

Balance theory (Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1961) would

predict that associates are likely to hold similar
attitudes.

If A, B, and C are actors in a structure, and A

and B support an issue, then C is highly likely to support
the same issue.

This approach suggests there will be an

effect of community integration on household security
measures even though these decisions are personal and are
made privately.
Another way that social networks may affect action
indirectly comes about in explaining the psychological
perspective.

Integration in a social network affects fear

of victimization (Warr, 1990; Hunter and Baumer, 1982}.
The presence of others can be assuring, or alternatively
can cause greater levels of fear and the key to
understanding reactions to others is familiarity (Warr,
1990; Goffman, 1971) .

Cities are populated by strangers

(Wirth, 1938; Lofland, 1973) and social integration reduces
fear by reducing the proportion of strangers people
interact with in everyday life and reducing the strangeness
of routine life in the neighborhood (Hunter and Baumer,
1982).

Another argument for the indirect effects of social

networks derives from their influence on attitude formation
(Newcomb, 1961; Straits, 1990).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

21

Criticism of the Social Network Approach
The social network perspective has been subject to
criticism.

The primary critique of social network theory

is that it is too purely structural and ignores the content
of ties, without which it is difficult to predict anything
(Kilburn,

1992) .

Social network theorists also have a problem in
explaining the influence of levels of integration.

Though

numerous studies have shown that people act in a similar
manner to others in their social network (Homans, 1950;
Newcomb,

1961; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966), the

process influencing these behaviors is subject to debate.
Are individuals more likely to act like the people they are
close to or are they more likely to act like people with
whom they share similar status?

Homans (1950),

and

Coleman (1990a) argue that socializing bonds are
influential in diffusing information and influence in
proscribing and prescribing appropriate actions.

Burt

(1987) showed that actors sharing a frame of reference with
those having similar patterns of relations within the
social structure (structural equivalence) are likely to act
in a similar manner to those people significantly more than
actors tied together by socializing bonds.
The content of ties differ with individuals in various
types of networks.

Not only do characteristics of networks
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differ among people, each individual interacts among
diverse types of networks on an everyday basis.

Current

social network theory does offer an explanation of power
and influence in networks.
The Rational Choice Approach
The psychological, stratification, and social network
approaches have failed to explain the free rider problem.
I attempt to present a modified rational choice theory as
an empirically testable approach to the social phenomenon
of security that applies to the micro, meso, and macro
levels.

This theory addresses all three of Coleman's

(1990a, p.11) components of systemic behavior theory:
a) A set of roles that players take on, each role
defining the interests or goals of the player.
b) Rules about the kinds of actions that are
allowable for players in each role, as well as
about the order of play.
c) Rules specifying the consequences that each
player's action has for other players in the
game.
Rational choice theory borrows from all three of the
previously mentioned perspectives.

From the psychological

perspective, rational choice uses the concept of the value
of the private or public good.

From the stratification

perspective, rational choice theory looks at similarly
situated actors sharing the development of norms,
interests, and values.

Rational choice theory uses the
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social network perspective to explain the role of
sanctioning ability of others in influencing participation
in collective actions and the internalization of norms.
James Coleman's (1990a) Foundations of Social Theory
outlines a version of rational choice theory that seeks to
account for the functioning of a social system.

Coleman's

aim for rational choice theory is not to eliminate other
environmental and structural influences as explanations but
instead to account for behaviors they fail to explain.
Rational choice theory explains how a norm arises and the
tvpe and effectiveness of sanctions that enforce the norm.
The task is to explain social phenomena, not the behavior
of individuals:

"A norm is a property of a social system,

not an action within it"

(Coleman, 1990b, p.35).

Coleman's

theory is one of purposive action in which actors seek
maximization of utility under constraints of social
context:

"We say that we understand the 'reasons' why the

person acted in a certain way, implying that we understand
the intended goal and how the actions were seen by the
actor to contribute to that goal"

(Coleman,

1990a; p.13).

Rational choice theory has traditionally been vexed
with the problem of explaining institutional genesis®
(Hechter, Opp, Wippler,

1990).

Rational choice theory can

Coleman defines institutional genesis as the creation and
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be extended to explain security provision as a product of
the interaction between actors' needs to obtain welfare and
deference goods.

Welfare goods are directly provided

material goods, while deference goods are indirectly
provided as personal gratification (Lasswell and Kaplan,
1950).
Rational choice theory can be applied to the adoption
of individual-level security behaviors.
take place in a vacuum.

Exchange does not

Although the value of the good is

an important incentive for action, social exchange analysis
focuses on alters' conduct and too frequently ignores ego's
personal traits
and interactive.

(Blau, 1964).

Relationships are dynamic

The network defines normative behavior

that influences actions and constitutes a structural
constraint by placing an individual in an environment with
a relatively small set of options

(Jankowski, 1992).

Although the theoretical problem is explaining action
and outcomes in a social system, Coleman's theory is based
on an individual-level theory of action.

Whereas some may

criticize individual level analysis of groups form because
individuals cannot efficiently achieve their own ends by
themselves

(Smith, 1981 {1786}; deToqueville, 1956 {1835}).

Because free riding appears to be a rational action,
Coleman (1990a) argues that we are faced with two problems.
The first-order public good problem comes about when each
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individual will benefit only from the contribution of
others.

The second-order public good problem is that

sanctioning free riders may be costly to the collective
(Heckathorn, 1989).

Both norm development and norm

maintenance require that individuals in a system legitimate
and internalize norms.

The first-order good problem is

solved from either individuals valuing the good or from
some outside threat.
Coleman (1990a) and Hechter (1987) suggest that the
free rider problem can be understood in terms of
solidarity.

Relationships of reciprocity discourage

defection from contributing to a good.

Actors more

enmeshed in the community are more likely to comply with
collective rules because they are the most likely to lose
something in the sanctioning process.

Those embedded in

the system are more likely to internalize norms join with
like-minded individuals in order to produce the good.
From a systemic perspective, effective norms must be
enforced by sanctions.

Legitimacy is a necessary condition

for providing a consistent explanation of behavioral
influence.

In becoming dependent on a collective, people

give others legitimacy to sanction their own behavior.

At

first this may not seem like a rational act, but by giving
up this right to control one's own behavior, a person
affiliates with a legitimated collective with power over
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its members.

Those observing norms receive a right to

impose sanctions on norm violators, while those not
observing the norm have less power in imposing those norms
on others.

Rational egoists choose to belong to a group

because they are dependent on other members (Thibaut and
Kelley, 1959) .

Coleman summarized this by stating: "If a

person comes to identify with a socializing agent, that is,
to see his interests as identical to those of the agent,
then the claim by the agent of a right to control will be
seen as legitimate, because it is a claim deriving from
interests the person sees as his own"

(1990a, p. 289) .

Coleman expands rational choice theory to explain the
free rider problem for individual behavior within macro
level actions.

He acknowledges that voting behavior seems

to be a difficult problem for rational choice theorists.
Even in small local elections, one vote is not likely to
affect the outcome.

Thus, even though the cost of voting

is minimal in time and effort, the manifest reward is
arguably negligible.

Coleman explains that

"psychic

benefits" are offered to voters through acting in a manner
similar to their reference group.
Hechter (1987) stresses visibility of actions in
understanding the free rider problem.

In order for groups

to control the behavior of members, the targeted behaviors
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must be monitored and the group must have the right to
sanction individual actors.

Monitoring capacity depends on

the degree to which it possesses information about
individual compliance with corporate rules or obligations.
In sanctioning group members^ the group must be able to
encourage compliance and/or discourage deviance from group
norms.
Group size affects both the monitoring and sanctioning
capacity of the group.

Monitoring behavior has variable

costs, dependent on the visibility of the behavior and the
size of the group.

Less valuable goods and private

behaviors are less visible and create more sanctioning
costs.

This follows modernization theories, in which

individuals are taken from their web of "gemeinschaft"
(cohesive, intimate)

relationships and placed into less

intricate "gesellschaft"

(disengaged, impersonal)

relationships (Toennies,

1957).

It could be argued that

modernization leads to a reduction in local intimacy.
Individuals face greater obligations in a gemeinschaft
relationship than they do in dealing with the faceless
members of the gesellschaft population.

Members of a large

group are more likely to be able to act in anonymity, so
sanctioning costs may be high, requiring coercion that is
legitimized by a larger aggregate.

Hechter (1987) proposed

that those with closer ties to the community are more
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dependent on the group, and this leads to greater group
obligations.
At the macro level, Hechter claims that formal
controls are developed for legitimated coercion, such as a
municipal criminal justice system.

As for applying the

free rider argument to voting behavior, this solidarity
explanation must assume internalization of a belief system
that leads to the altruistic behavior of going to the polls
and casting a ballot.
the good:

This theory neglects the value of

Those valuing the good are expected to be more

compliant with the group's expectations. Individuals value
goods differently.

When people pay the same amount of

money for the same service but value the service
differently, one achieves higher profit than the other.
Summary
The problem of order writ small is the problem of
security.

Security can be viewed at three discrete levels:

the household or micro level, the neighborhood or meso
level, and the municipal or macro level. Although the
relationships between levels are clearly an important
sociological problem, sociologists have been slow to
address the issue.

Although patterns of collective action

enhance or reduce security at all levels, individual
actors' support for one level of security is not
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necessarily an accurate predictor of support at another
level.

The public goods problem makes security at meso and

macro levels a different question than that of individual
adoption.

Meso and macro levels of security differ because

residents of neighborhoods differ in the cost they are
willing to bear to obtain the public good as well as the
benefits they receive from the public good.

Initially,

free riding appears to be a rational action.
I have presented three approaches that have been used
to understand the problem of security provision but fail to
provide an adequate solution to the problem of security,
primarily because of their failure to address the
implications of the free rider problem.

The psychological

approach is advantageous because it offers a simple
explanation of the problem:

Fear of victimization causes

actors to take a variety of individual precautions.
However, the psychological approach does not account for
why individuals with the same level of fear may contribute
differently to collective action.
The stratification approach offers the idea that
personal traits such as socioeconomic status, age, and race
are the primary influences on certain types of action
related to security concerns.

People in different social

positions defined by status characteristics

(e.g. stages of

the life course or different social classes) have
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distinctive interests and means to address problems.

A

shortcoming of this approach is that many areas with
similar status characteristics have the potential to act a
certain way but do not.

Similar groups may differ in

levels of altruism and free riding (Hechter, 1987).
The social network approach proposes that the primary
determinants of behavior are patterns of relationships.
People associating with like others will participate in
similar types of behavior at all levels of security.
Though the concept of rootedness has been successful in
predicting contributions to public goods, the social
network approach does not address differences between
levels.

Rootedness in a neighborhood may actually lead to

an organized neighborhood movement that opposes
contributions to a municipal-level good.

The linkage

between integration in the community social network and the
adoption of similar household actions remains unclear.
The rational choice approach addresses security
practices at all three levels, accounting for private and
public goods.

Rational choice accounts for micro-level

security by examining the value of the good and psychic
benefits offered through action that follows prescribed
norms.

Rational choice also proposes a solution to the

free rider problem by mapping out influence in the social
network.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

31

In the next chapter, hypotheses derived from
psychological, stratification, social network, and rational
choice approaches will be developed.

I will describe a

single neighborhood in Baton Rouge as a strategic research
context in which to test hypotheses on security practices
in a stable, bounded system of homogeneous actors.

This

chapter uses census data, personal interviews, and
newspaper reports to describe the social context, political
environment, and cultural history of one particular
neighborhood,

focusing on the need and provision of

security services at all levels.

A survey of 137 residents

of the neighborhood I will call "Midtown" provides data to
test empirically each approach to understanding the problem
of security.
Chapter three tests these hypotheses using
multivariate analytical techniques.

First, I test the

congruence among support for security measures at the
micro, meso, and macro levels.

Then, I test the

significance of factors deemed important in each
theoretical approach to predicting provision of each level
of security.
Chapter four discusses the findings presented in
chapter three.

I address the central finding that each

dimension of security has a unique set of determinants.
Because of this, no single variable or combination of
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variables is related directly to participation in or
support for household, neighborhood, and municipal security
measures.

I argue that the concept of trust needs to be

incorporated or central to the study of security in order
to understand its micro, meso, and macro dimensions.
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CHAPTER 2.

SECURITY-RELATED HYPOTHESES

Introduction

This chapter outlines hypotheses on the relations
among and determinant of security practices at various
levels.

First, I present hypotheses on the relationships

among levels of security.

Next, I present hypotheses on

the adoption of or support for security measures at
household, neighborhood, and civic levels.

This will be

accomplished using each of the psychological,
stratification, social network, and rational choice
perspectives.

Finally, I describe the research site, data,

and variables used to test the hypotheses.
Individual responses to crime are hotly debated issues
in governmental policy.

A platform addressing citizens'

rights to own handguns for personal protection contributed
to electoral support for Louisiana's newly elected Governor
Mike Foster.

Security companies that supply guards and

alarm systems are growth industries in the United States.
Crime is a social problem that requires a collective
response.

Though individuals may be able to protect

themselves and prevent some crimes, for thousands of years
societies have had criminal justice systems employing
specialists.

However, people often fall into the trap of

collective goods, in which everyone believes that the good

33
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is of benefit but not everyone is willing to contribute to
its provision.
Just as free riding may occur in a neighborhood, there
is concern that neighborhoods may contribute to private
provision of services (such as security) to the exclusion
of support for governmental services that are shared with
other citizens in the municipality (McKenzie, 1994; Reich,
1991).

Although all citizens pay taxes and receive the

benefits of protection by the government's criminal justice
system, citizens do have a voice in government that
influences their tax liability and governmental service
delivery.

The growing number of affluent neighborhoods

providing private security services leads to the question:
"Does private government lead to a withdrawal of support
for municipal governments?"
Household, Community, and Municipal Level Hypotheses

In the last chapter, I introduced the idea that
security may be viewed within a three-level framework: the
household level, the neighborhood level, and the municipal
level.

However, the outstanding question that has been

addressed by no prior study is whether security practices
at these various levels tend to be substitutional or
complementary.

If security-related behaviors are

predominantly a substitutional phenomenon, residents taking
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one set of measures are less likely to support other types
of security measures.

For example, those residents taking

actions in and around their home may be less likely to
support contributions for private duty patrolling or
supplementing the citywide police force.

Conversely, those

contributing to the neighborhood patrol and city police may
be less inclined to take extra measures in and around their
homes.
However, the alternative argument is that security are
complementary phenomena, with residents who take more
security measures in and around the home being more likely
to support contributions for private-duty patrolling to
supplement the citywide police force.

This might be the

case if security is more highly valued by some individuals,
who are then motivated to invest in diverse security
measures.

Weapons purchases (McDowall and Loftin, 1983)

and neighborhood association formation may begin as a
response to the perceived lack of police efficacy.

When

individuals take action at the household level, they are
less likely to want to spend money and energy supporting
other levels of security.

However, because defense of

one's own home and the area around it is viewed as a top
priority (Warr and Stafford, 1983), I expect to find a
strong positive relationship between household security
measures and participation in neighborhood associations.
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H._. Those taking a larger number of household
security measures will be more likely to join
neighborhood associations promoting security.
I expect to find support for the thesis that household
and civic-level security support are essentially
constituted as private behaviors that are not susceptible
to sanctions from other members of the community.
Neighborhood order differs from the individual and public
orders in that the actors are not dealing with "a world of
strangers" (Hunter, 1985; Lofland, 1973; Fischer,

1984).

Although residents of a given geographic area are subject
to similar socialization pressures (Shevky and Bell, 1955;
Festinger, Schacter, and Back, 1950), community influence
is exerted only on behaviors that can be publicly
sanctioned.

Because voting is a private action, often kept

secret among close friends (Laumann, 1973), household and
civic behaviors are private and are less likely to be
influenced by network members.
H. : Support for household security measures will
be positively related to support for civic-level
security measures.
In the context of neighborhood crime prevention,
actors behave in a less anonymous public manner.
"Community coercion" influences participation regardless of
personal support for extra-duty patrolling.'

Due to its

In one study, police patrolling was not found to
significantly reduce crime levels, nor did it reduce fear
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confidential nature, voting is a private act.

Moreover,

paying a fee for neighborhood patrolling in addition to
paying taxes for a police department leads to the dilemma
of "double taxation"

(Reich, 1991).

Residents paying for

community patrolling may be satisfied with their level of
protection for their home and family.

However, some people

are not interested in contributing to public goods at
either the neighborhood or the municipal level.

Others may

contribute to all types of security because they value the
feeling of safety.

These cross-pressures lead to various

configurations of support for or opposition to additional
taxes.

Therefore,

I expect to find no relationship between

participation in neighborhood-level security measures and
support for civic- level measures.
H: : Membership in the neighborhood association
will not be significantly related to electoral
support for civic-level security measures.
Psychological Hypotheses

In this section, the expected relationship between
fear of crime and security measures is discussed as the
focal point for understanding individual actions related to
security provision.

In addressing security at the

household (micro) level, several types of precautions can
of crime, attitudes toward police, or the number of
preventive measures taken. This may mean that joining
neighborhood associations has results other than reducing
fear of crime (Kelling et al, 1974).
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be taken which have been shown to decrease victimization
levels for some types of crime (Miethe, 1991).
The problem of security extends beyond actual
victimization.

The psychological perspective suggests that

people taking measures related to security may be seeking
to reduce their fear of crime.
victimization

Although actual

affects directly only a small percentage of

the population, nearly everyone alters their lifestyle to
some degree out of fear of victimization.

Spatial and

temporal avoidance are among the most common responses to
fear of crime (DuBcw et al, 1979; Skogan and Maxfield,
1981).

Low-cost avoidance behaviors include: avoiding

going out alone or at night, avoiding certain places in the
city, and refusing to answer the door.

However, protective

actions are technical in nature, requiring modification of
the household environment such as: installing security
fences or alarms, door locks and chains, window locks, or
outdoor lighting; purchasing a dog for protection; and
owning a gun (DuBow et al, 1979; Skogan and Maxfield,
1981).
Skogan (1977) and Hindelang et al.

(1978) argue that

individuals who are most fearful should be the most likely
to take security measures.

However, empirical research has

shown that this relationship is not that simple:

Those
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with the highest levels of personal fear are most likely to
take on avoidance behaviors (Warr, 1984; Skogan and
Maxfield,

1981).

Research on protective actions

(specifically, the study of gun ownership) has produced
mixed findings (DuBow, McCabe, and Kaplan, 1979; Wright et
al., 1983) .
Fear of becoming a victim does lead to the adoption of
protective actions.

Females and the elderly have the

highest levels of fear of crime because they are more
likely to view themselves as vulnerable, and less likely to
be able to defend themselves (Warr, 1984; Hindelang,
Gottfredson, and Garofalo,

1978).

I hypothesize that those

most afraid of being victimized are more likely to take
avoidance and protective measures.
Fear of crime will be strongly and
positively related to the number of avoidance
measures taken.
Hjo: Fear of crime will be weakly and positively
related to the number of protective behaviors
taken.
There should be differences between members and non
members of neighborhood associations.

Residents may differ

in their assessment of security needs and may also have
different beliefs about the efficacy of the association.
Podolefsky and DuBow (1981) studied differences between
members and non-members of neighborhood crime prevention
groups.

They found no difference between the two groups in
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perceptions of crime, neighborhood conditions, or the
efficacy of collective crime prevention activities.

In

their study of voluntary block association membership. Rich
and Wandersman (1983) showed that psychological factors
such as feelings of control over one's life, personal
satisfaction, and political cynicism were unrelated to
membership.
Hç: Fear of crime will not be significantly
related to neighborhood association membership.
Because the government is the primary distributor of
public goods,

influencing the government is essential in

all collective consumption issues.

Because the police have

been viewed as bearing primary responsibility for deterring
crime, the public's fear of crime may work to the benefit
of the police when asking for more resources (Moore and
Trojanowicz,

1988) .

The state has legitimated coercion;

therefore, all citizens must pay taxes and can only voice
their support or opposition to governmental services
(Hirschman, 1970).

This voice is articulated through the

electoral process and opinion polls, but the former has a
direct impact on the level of police resources that will be
provided.

I predict that those most fearful are most

likely to support the idea of paying a premium for extra
protection :
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Those most fearful of crime will be more
likely to support tax referenda to provide
supplemental funding for the criminal justice
system.
Because public goods do lead to competition for
resources, race has been noted as a key factor in electoral
politics dealing with the distribution of resources
(Carmines and Stimson,

1989).

Citizens do not vote

directly on racial issues, but there is a tendency for
white citizens

(especially in the South) to identify

themselves as having shared interests that are defined by a
perceived conflict with the interests of blacks
1972).

(Davidson,

Tax referenda issues may be especially salient in

racially segregated neighborhoods, with white middle-class
residents viewing their extra tax dollars paying for extra
policing in high crime

(or black) neighborhoods.

H-g: Those residents with stronger anti-black
beliefs will be more likely to vote against law
enforcement tax referenda.
Conservative political ideology is often believed to
be related to anti-tax sentiment.

Even though

conservatives are often believed to be more concerned with
law and order political issues, they also are more likely
to question the way governmental funds are allocated, with
the implication that the government spends enough money on
crime but does not spend it wisely.
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: Residents with more conservative political
ideologies will be more likely to vote against
the tax referenda.
Stratification Hypotheses

Ascribed and achieved social statuses may influence
individual decisions to adopt specific practices related to
security.

Variables such as being married, owning a home,

and having higher incomes have been shown to be related to
taking precautionary measures (Lavrakas et al., 1981)
Also, the presence of children may alter adults'
perspectives on crime from individual fear to altruistic
fear (e.g. fear for a spouse and for children)
1992) .

(Warr,

Although prior research has not addressed the

relationship between life course stage and participation in
crime-prevention organizations, the sociological literature
has shown that life course constraints affect membership in
various types of voluntary organizations.

Obligations

create incentives to join organizations, though time
constraints may inhibit active membership when young
children are in the home (Knoke and Thomson, 1977).
Further, families in the child-rearing stage of the life
cycle are more likely to value enhanced police protection.
® Individual residents and neighborhoods with higher
incomes make a relatively smaller sacrifice when they
allocate funds for security measures (Knoke and Thomson,
1977). Because there is very little variance in the
neighborhood studied, I do not analyze income as a
variable.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

43

However, they are also more likely to face constraints of
having less free time and disposable income to contribute
to joint goods.
Marxist scholars argue that residents who share a
location depend on the same service provision, leading them
to develop similar interests in the procurement of a
service (Castells, 1977; 1983).

Membership in specific

socioeconomic groups suggests probable voting actions
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948).

For example,

"stakeholders" in the community are more likely to act in
a pro-community manner, protecting themselves and their
neighbors from the possibility of property devaluation
(Logan and Molotch, 1987).
Lo (1990) has shown that homeowners form coalitions to
keep property taxes low because they believe that they are
paying a disproportionate share of tax revenue for the
am.ount of goods and services they receive from the
government.

Policing is a good that is of common interest

to all citizens and is shared by everyone, but the wealthy
pay more for the service because they pay higher taxes.
The general public often views crime as a problem in "the
other guy's neighborhood," with other areas getting worse
while the respondent's own area is viewed as stable (DuBow
et al., 1979) .
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Hga: Married householders will take more
avoidance measures.
Hgb: Individuals who have children in the home
will take more avoidance measures.
Hçg: Married householders will take more
precautionary measures.
Hçb: Individuals who have children in the home
will take more precautionary measures.
At the community level, research has shown that
homogeneous, middle-class areas are in a better position to
organize and provide social control than less affluent
areas (Skogan, 1990; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Guest and
Oropesa,

1986; Oropesa, 1989; Crenson, 1983).

Home

ownership increases one's stake in the community, which
encourages residents to improve the community and provide
social control
and Castells

(Crenson, 1983).

Logan and Molotch (1987)

(1983) have discussed the role of community

organization development as a tool for the preservation of
homeowners' property values.
Residents may differ in their assessment of the
security deficit and they may also have different beliefs
about the efficacy of the system.

Podolefsky and DuBow

(1981) studied differences between members and non-members
of neighborhood crime prevention groups.

They found no

difference in perceptions of crime, neighborhood
conditions, or the efficacy of collective crime prevention
activities.

Although family protection generates

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

45

commitments, neighborhood association membership may be too
far removed from the same influences on protective measures
taken in and around the house.
Hioa: There will be no relationship between being
married and neighborhood association membership.
There will be no relationship between having
children in the home and neighborhood association
membership.
There will be no relationship between
educational attainment and neighborhood
association membership.
Both the benefit and cost of policing are shared by
all classes (though not equally), with several organized
interests competing for public benefits
1983; Rich, 1982a, 1982b).

(Castells, 1977,

Traditionally, membership in

specific socioeconomic groups suggests probable voting
actions (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948), but within a single
homogeneous community income is not expected to be related
to participation.
Tax liability will be explored for its influence on
voting behavior.

Hahn and Kamienecki (1987) argue that

"while high status voters may be willing to utilize their
resources to support local services in the communities in
which they live, they apparently are not prepared to
subsidize the disadvantaged"

(p.124).

Louisiana's

homestead exemption law creates two groups of residents:
those exempt from parish property taxes, and those that
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must pay parish property taxes.

Surprisingly, research has

shown that even though they pay more in taxes, the wealthy
are often more supportive of tax increases than middleincome people.

Wilson and Banfield (1964) explain this

phenomenon as a function of diminishing marginal utility in
which wealthier citizens make less of a sacrifice to pay
additional taxes.

However, Weaver and Parent (1994) show

that this finding of wealthier citizens being more willing
to support taxes holds only for developmental programs that
improve the condition of the entire metropolitan area and
not redistributive programs that provide more services for
one section (most often less affluent) of the city.
Because crime is often viewed as a problem in "the other
guy's neighborhood," I expect that a tax for enhanced
criminal justice revenue will discourage some people from
supporting the tax.

Enhanced police protection may be

viewed as developmental by some citizens and redistributive
by others.
Hii: There will be no relationship between tax
liability and electoral support for the tax
referenda.
Because both electoral support and adoption of
security measures by individual households are largely
subject to individual decision-making processes, I argue
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that an effect similar to household adoption processes will
occur.
H,_2 : Married individuals and those who have
children in the home will be more likely to vote
for tax referenda which support supplemental
policing measures.
Social Network Hypotheses

DeToqueville stated that civic associations are built
through reciprocity among members (1956 {1835}).
Commitment to community varies, with homeowners and those
with dense neighborhood relations being more willing to
commit resources to the community.

Length of residence and

community attachment have been shown to be strongly related
to residential stability and commitment to community
organizations in previous studies- (Kasarda and Janowitz,
1974) .
Toennies (1957) and Mirth (1938) are among theorists
who have criticized the idea that communities offer
solidarity and opportunities for social support in the
modern age.

Theories based on this tradition have been

labeled "Community Lost" approaches (Wellman, 1979) .

Both

Wellman (1979) and Wellman and Wortley (1990) have refuted
Neighborhood interaction can be measured in terms of the
frequency of informal interaction (Keller, 1968). Kasarda
and Janowitz measured informal community participation
through interaction with other residents and formal
organization participation through a series of questions
about participation in several different types of community
organizations.
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the Community Lost approach by showing that many ties still
exist among members of communities.

The ties may be weak

and single-stranded (offering minimal amounts of support
and low levels of intimacy) but they do exist.
longer geographically bound.

Ties are no

Podolefsky and DuBow (1981)

found a significant difference between community
organization participants and non-participants in that
individuals who were more integrated into the community
were more likely to participate.
Rich and Wandersman (1983) studied membership in urban
neighborhood voluntary block associations.

Demographic

variables such as race, education, and occupation were not
related to membership in these associations.

Nor were

psychological factors such as feelings of control over
one's life, personal satisfaction, and political cynicism
related to membership.

Instead, variables reflecting

"rootedness," such as length of residence and residential
stability in the community (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974;
Hunter, 1975; Lewis and Salem, 1986; Sampson, 1988) and
having a number of ties in the area (Guest and Oropesa,
1986; Crenson, 1983) are believed to influence involvement
in the neighborhood.
Isolates have a greater fear of crime (Fischer,

1982)

and are expected to take a greater number of measures to
avoid being victimized.

Because knowledge of neighbors
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decreases the number of "strangers" in the area (Hunter and
Baumer, 1982), there is a greater freedom to interact
around the neighborhood.

Because residents more integrated

in the community are expected to know more about the
community, they are more able to differentiate "strangers"
from neighbors and will take fewer avoidance measures.
: Those more integrated in the community will
take fewer avoidance measures.
However, Skogan (1977) found that integration into the
community social network may lead to increased levels of
neighborhood gossip that can in turn, lead to more
knowledge of neighborhood crime and higher levels of fear.
Having knowledge of other burglary victims positively
affects the employment of protective measures against
burglary (Lavrakas et al., 1981).

While knowledge of

neighbors may protect individuals from personal crime, this
knowledge offers little protection from property crime when
the resident is away from home.

Because of this, I predict

no relationship between knowledge of neighbors and the
number of protective measures individuals take.
H,;.t,: There will be no relationship between
integration in the community social network and
the number of household protective measures
taken.
Although people are more likely to join organizations
of which their friends are members (Spaulding, 1966) , some
research has questioned the rootedness explanation of
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community organization membership.

In studying meso-level

behaviors, both Hunter (19^5) and Guterbock (1980) found no
relationship between local ties and membership in local
organizations or political activity. *° As for macro-level
behaviors, Laumann (1969, 1973) found that reciprocated
friendship pairs neither matched nor described accurately
their friends on political views, party registration, or
ideation.
Political behavior is the product of the dialectic
between individuals and their surrounding culture (Hunter,
1975; Crenson, 1983) and those identifying with the
particular culture are more likely to take action.
Residents of a community may contribute to a community good
even if they do not value the good significantly more than
non-contributors do (Oskamp et al. 1991), or if there is
question about the patrolling providing security.
H-: Integration into the community will be
associated with neighborhood association
membership.
Network data will be used to examine the relationship
between integration into the neighborhood and electoral
behavior.

Although Laumann (1969, 1973) found that

reciprocated friendship pairs neither matched nor described
friends' political views, party registration, or ideation.
■■ Both Hunter and Guterbock studied organizations which
required both time commitments and monetary contributions
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Burstein (1976) found that friendship ties may be more
significant predictors than social and demographic
characteristics in predicting voting behavior.

Other

factors which have been seen as significant, such as party
affiliation (Hahn and Kamieneki, 1987), ideology (Converse,
1964), gender of voter (Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld,
1980), and other sociodemographic factors

(Campbell,

Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960) will be used as control
variables.

Because tax referenda do not receive as much

publicity as candidate elections, there is considerably
less discussion and influence among peers about their
voting behavior.

This should lead to less influence on

each other's voting decisions.
H:;: There will be no relationship between
integration into the community social network and
electoral support for tax referenda.
Rational Choice Hypotheses

Lavrakas et al.

(1981) stated that "citizens become

involved in anti-crime activities not because of personal
assessment of being at risk or any past experiences with
victimization, but rather as part of their participation
with formal voluntary associations within the community
(p.3)."

The rational choice perspective takes individual

interests as given and examines incentives and constraints
for actors.

It explores coercive abilities of others in
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the system and how others may influence actors' behaviors.
Rational choice theory borrows from the psychological,
stratification, and social network perspectives to develop
an argument for support for security at the micro, meso,
and macro levels.

The psychological model contributes the

value of the good to the equation.

The stratification

approach contributes the explanation that actors behave
within the constraints of a system of like others and also
form coalitions with that same group to procure public
goods (Castells,

1977).

The social network perspective

views integration and rootedness as enhancing potential
sanctioners' influence.
In the psychological model, fear is believed to be a
salient variable predicting micro, meso, and macro security
support.

However, just as support for one kind of security

is not necessarily related to support for another kind, the
impact of fear on security practices is not constant at all
levels.

I expect fear to be a more salient predictor of

action at the micro and macro levels, and a less salient
predictor of support for security practices at the
neighborhood organization (meso) l e v e l . W h i l e interests
Residents of neighborhoods with community crime watch
programs who do not participate still have a lower risk of
burglary than those in neighborhoods without similar
programs (Lindsay and McGillis, 1986). By law, an officer
on patrol cannot ignore specific homes, even if the officer
is on private duty and the prospective victim does not

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

53

are taken as a given, attitudinal development is considered
to be a complex process combining status, networks,
options, and constraints.

Rational choice theory views

attitudes as intervening variables.
From the stratification perspective, actors are
influenced differently by their relationships for each type
of security concern.

The study of a single, homogeneous

neighborhood does not allow for the analysis of some racial
and socioeconomic effects on the various dimensions of
security.

Also, because this study focuses on the

household as the unit of analysis, the relationship between
sex and security-related behaviors is not analyzed.’
-- At
the micro level, the effect of status characteristics on
the adoption of practices related to security will be
explained by fear of crime.

Status characteristics will

only have an indirect effect through fear of crime.

At the

meso level, status characteristics should have no effect on
neighborhood association membership because neighborhoods
are relatively homogeneous entities (Massey and Denton,
1993; Fischer, 1982).

At the macro level, wealthy people

are more likely not to want to spend on redistributive
contribute dues.
-- I assume that a protective measure taken around the home
benefits all members of the household, just as membership
in the civic association covers households and not just
individuals.
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referenda.

Too, residents with little trust in the local

government are less likely to support tax increases for the
criminal justice system because they are less likely to
believe that government is capable or willing to address
their concerns.
Social network variables should affect individual
attitudes.

However, I expect that there will be no effect

of integration in the community social network on household
security measures.
Newcomb,

Although balance theory (Heider, 1958;

1961) would predict that associates are likely to

hold similar attitudes, Laumann (1973) showed that people
did not necessarily match their friends in private
decisions.

Following Hechter (1987), visibility should be

a key variable in explaining network effects.

Behaviors

must be visible in order to monitor the proscribed and
prescribed behaviors and some type of relationship must
exist for informal community sanctions to exist.

Household

and civic level measures are private level behaviors.
Actions within the neighborhood are more visible and
subject to monitoring.
H^^g: Household avoidance security measures will
be explained almost entirely by fear of crime.
Higb- Household preventive security measures will
be explained almost entirely by fear of crime.
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Hi:: Neighborhood association membership will be
explained by fear to a lesser extent than at
micro and macro levels and integration in the
neighborhood.
Hia: Security-related voting behavior will be
explained by fear of crime and trust in the local
government.

Data and Variable Description

Data
Data were collected, in face-to-face interviews, with
137 residents of a single neighborhood in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana (see Appendix A ) .

That neighborhood is referred

to here by the pseudonym "Midtown."

Because neighborhood

of residence is a key variable affecting attitudes and
actions related to community life (Crenson, 1983), the
investigation of one homogeneous neighborhood in detail
provides an appropriate context in which to test my
hypotheses.

Several important factors can be held constant

including neighborhood history, cultural influences, race,
education, and income.

I use the Midtown neighborhood as a

case study in order to test a stable, relatively
homogeneous system of actors.

A variety of methods are

employed to illustrate the social context of neighborhood
life.
^^This neighborhood is an older, established geographic
area located within a homogeneous U.S. Census classified
block group.
It is composed of parts of two census tracts
(see Appendix A ) . Residents of this area are part of a
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The Midtown area is worthy of study because:
a) It is a stable community that offers the opportunity for
meeting and interacting with others.
b) Residents of the area represent an important segment of
the electorate with high voting participation in all types
of elections.
c) House values are mixed, resulting in variability in
property tax liability among the area's residents.
d) Residents of this area can afford to pay for private
duty patrolling in their neighborhood.
The survey instrument included several questions
about the respondents' household structure, and
socioeconomic status, as well as sentiments about their
neighborhood, social networks, personal and neighborhood
security, public affairs, crime, and racial issues.
Questions measuring fear of crime, social status, and
social networks are key independent variables in the
hypotheses.
The Midtown area is homogeneous with respect to race,
income, and education (see Appendix A, Table A-3).

The

area is located in a census block group that is 99% nonHispanic white, 0% black.

Median income is well above that

homogeneous voting precinct.
I have chosen this area to
study because it is recognized as a neighborhood by most of
its residents though the study area does not exist within a
governmentally classified geographic region.
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of city as a whole.

Fewer than 1% of the residents are

recorded as living below the poverty line, and no one in
this block group is on public assistance (1990 U.S.
Census).

The median year in which the housing structure

was built was 1953.

In short, this area is an older,

established neighborhood whose residents are white and
middle class.

However, due to its location near the city

center, it is surrounded by less affluent minority
neighborhoods with higher crime rates.

In chapter three, I

will give a detailed account of community characteristics
based on survey responses.
Among collective crime-prevention programs,
"neighborhood watch" programs are among the most common and
most studied.

The primary purpose of neighborhood watch is

to promote surveillance of the neighborhood by residents,
but effectiveness of this program is questionable.
(Garofalo and McLeod, 1989).

Also, because most

neighborhood watch programs have no fees, dues, or time
commitments, it is often difficult to study participation
and commitment to the program (Garofalo and McLeod, 1989;
Lewis et al, 1988).

For this reason it is preferable to

study residents' participation at the neighborhood level
where there exist recorded contributions to the local civic
association.
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I conducted several interviews with founders and
current leaders of this group.

Ms. Jones, the leader of

the group, was born and raised in the neighborhood and
purchased her house in 1979.

Along with a few friends and

family members residing in the area, she decided to start
an independent neighborhood security organization.

Dues

were established at $30.00 a month for area schools and the
synagogue and $10.00 for the area's residents.

The group

began hiring off-duty patrols for two to four hours per day
at a rate of $10.00 per hour.

In 1995, they paid $12.00 an

hour for four to six hours per day patrolling.

This

provision of security the only activity of the group.

The

police patrol the neighborhood in a marked car, stopping
and questioning people they believe are not area
residents.-’ According to Ms. Jones, an officer once told
her "we don't 'have a lot to do" and she replied "that's our
goal."

All of the civic association's budget goes toward

police patrolling and as a group, they have no political
opinions or goals.

They have no regular meetings because

attempts have produced very low turnout.
In addition to this neighborhood level program, I have
chosen to analyze three recent tax referenda that targeted
the municipal criminal justice system as the beneficiary of

During the interviewing process, I was stopped and
questioned by the police at three different times.
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the revenue.

The first occurred in January, 1992, a

sheriff's tax referendum that failed by a 3-to-l margin.
The East Baton Rouge law enforcement district tax was the
only issue on the ballot that day.

The tax proposed to

supply $7.4 million per year for 10 years, to

pay for

employee raises, pay off the office's deficit, allow for
hiring new employees, and create an emergency surplus fund.
Because the tax lacked specifics, groups across the
political spectrum opposed this tax.
In July of 1992, the city of Baton Rouge proposed a
property tax for the police and fire departments.

The

distribution of the tax was clearly outlined and
publicized.

Salaries would be raised and outdated

equipment would be replaced.

This tax was supported by the

mayor, 11 of the 12 metropolitan council members,

the AFL-

CIO, major media outlets, and many other groups.

The tax

was opposed by a marriage of convenience consisting of the
NAACP, Nation of Islam, and East Baton Rouge Parish
Republican executive committee.

Republicans fought the

idea of the tax and the black community was angered over
two recent police shooting deaths of an unarmed black youth
and a retarded black man with a toy gun.
In October 1993, a third tax proposal was placed on
the ballot.

Sheriff Elmer Litchfield campaigned heavily

for the tax and promised to open his budget to the public.
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Litchfield promised to hire 65 new deputies, to reopen the
444-bed wing of the parish prison closed in 1992, hire
another 19 officers for other areas of the department, and
give the deputies a $2Q0-a-month raise and clerical workers
$100 more per month.

If the tax referendum failed, $1.6

million would be cut, forcing closure of 40 - 116 more
prison beds.

This referendum passed.

Dependent Variables
Household security measures are analyzed individually
as dependent variables and are grouped into indices.

One

index consists of avoidance behaviors and another of
protective measures.

Neighborhood participation is

measured both by self-report and presence on a list of
current dues-paying members of the Midtown Neighborhood
Association (MNA).

Support for civic-level security

improvement is measured by the respondents' reported voting
history on three tax referenda elections held in 1992 and

At the time of this referendum. Republican incumbent
Elmer Litchfield appeared to be entrenched in his position
as he sought a third term as East Baton Rouge Parish
Sheriff, facing Democrat Loyd Ingle as token opposition.
With a few minor referenda on the ballot, this was the most
publicized contest of a relatively unpublicized election
day. Before becoming sheriff, Litchfield was a retired FBI
agent.
Ingle's only experience with the law seemed to be
that he was booked three times (twice for suspicion of DUl,
once for a fight in a bar). Ingle also received negative
press earlier in the year when he was shot four times by
his wife during an argument.
1 expected that only the most
loyal Democrat would vote for him as sheriff.
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1993.

The index of avoidance measures*” consists of the

responses to three survey questions with a yes or no
response :
Do you ever avoid going out
alone?
Do you ever avoid going out at
night?
Do you ever avoid going some places
in the city?

Responses to eight survey questions dealing with
protective measures are used to construct a protective
measure index.*'

Cronbach's alpha for this three item scale is .617. A
principal component analysis of 11 micro-level security
measures creates this three term factor (eigenvalue =
1.64) .
Cronbach's alpha for this scale is .517. It could be
argued that this score is not very high. However, the
nature of protective security measures vary. Further
research should examine dimensions and determinants of
avoidance and protective measures. Of significant factors
created other than the three variable index of avoidance
measures, I saw no "simple structure" (Hatcher and
Stepanski, 1994) which these variables are related to the
exclusion of others (such as the factor combination of
leaving the television, radio, or lights on when out and
purchasing a weapon for protection). Therefore, I have
chosen to add the remaining household security variables as
protective.
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Since you have moved into your home, have
you:
installed an alarm system?
installed dead bolts?
purchased a dog for protection?
installed a security fence?
left the tv, radio, or lights on when
out?
purchased weapons for protection?
installed window locks or grates?

At the meso level, I will measure participation in
community security by the record of dues collection kept by
the treasurer of the Midtown Neighborhood Association.

If

a person had paid dues for at least six months out of the
previous year, they were counted as a member.
At the macro level, I will analyze three separate
responses to dichotomous questions that were asked on the
survey.

Turnout and voting choice are two distinct

phenomena.

For each of the three elections, I will measure

support/opposition to the tax, with analysis focusing on
the electoral decision.-'
The questions were worded as follows:

The dimensions studied here were not significant
predictors of electoral turnout.
I have chosen not to
interpret the absence of this effect.
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Did you vote in the tax election for the
sheriffs department this past October
loth?
If yes:
How did you vote?
If you remember, last year both the
sheriff's department (January, 1992) and
the city police department (July, 1992)
had elections that would have raised
property taxes in order to provide more
funding.
Did you vote in the sheriff's tax
election in January of 1992?
If yes:
How did you vote?
Did you vote in the police department's
tax election in July, 1992?
If yes:
How did you vote?

Independent Variables
In addressing the psychological argument, one must
acknowledge that measuring fear of crime is not simple.
Ferraro and Lagrange (1987) reviewed the fear of crime
literature and argued that different questions yield
different results.

Their work supported the validity of a

question that is often included in the NORC General Social
Survey:
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Is there any area right around here —
within a mile —

that is,

where you would be afraid to

walk alone at night?
This question addresses fear within a boundary close to the
individual's home.
Racial sentiment was recorded by the respondent's
answer on a four-point scale of agree strongly, agree
somewhat, disagree somewhat, and disagree strongly to the
statement, "Blacks have too little influence in the life
and politics of Baton Rouge.
Race, like security, is not a simple issue which can be
measured perfectly by one variable (Black and Black, 1989).
Responses to eight racial attitude variables were subjected
to a principal component analysis using the value of 1.0 as
prior communality estimates.
The principal axis method was
used to extract the components, followed by a varimax
(orthogonal) rotation (Hatcher and Stepanski, 1994) .
Though the first three components displayed eigenvalues
greater than 1 and scree tests suggested that the first
three factors were meaningful, two of the factors failed to
meet Hatcher and Stepanski's criteria of having at least
three variables with significant loadings on the retained
components. The remaining factor accounts for only thirtythree percent of the total variance.
Findings suggest that "racial attitudes" are not
captured by a single variable or factor, but are products
of a multi-level belief system. Blumer (1955) suggested
three color lines:
a) The outer color line supports basic human
rights of public facility access and voting
rights for people regardless of race.
b) The intermediate color line measures the
rights of individuals to reside in communities of
their choice, equal employment opportunity, and
fair access to schools.
c) The inner color line measures access to
friendship among races.
Numerous combinations of the variables that measure
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My measures of status characteristics are limited.
Due to the lack of variance in the community on several
socioeconomic status variables, it is not possible to
analyze income and race effects.^

The analysis is

therefore limited to assessing the effects of family living
arrangements and education.

The survey asks the number of

children under age twelve living in the home.

Education is

measured as the number of years of schooling completed.
Tax liability was recorded from the East Baton Rouge
property tax assessment roles.

Midtown residents listed as

having some property tax liability were recorded as liable,
while those with a homestead exemption on record for all of
their property were recorded as exempt.

racial attitudes provided scales with little internal
consistency (alphas ranging between .29 and .41). Zeroorder correlations show that the statement measuring black
influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge is
significantly related to other measures representing the
outer color line ("The police are too hard on blacks,"
"The courts are too hard on blacks") and the intermediate
color line ("People have the right to refuse to sell their
property to anyone they choose, black or white," "Most
people would prefer to live in neighborhoods with people of
their same race," "Would you personally prefer to live in a
neighborhood that is 1) all white
2) mostly white
3)
about half black and half white (and no respondent selected
4) mostly black 5) all black)."
Four out of five residents reported more than $ 30,000 a
year and more than half earn more than $ 45,000 a year.
Because the highest income category reported was $ 65,000
or above, there was little variance in the Midtown sample.
There are no black residents in the area.
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To measure social networks, I used a name generator name interpreter sequence.

Name generators set the

boundary that is examined in a survey for the respondents'
social networks (Marsden, 1987).

Name interpreters elicit

the characteristics of network members.

I used the name

interpreter that was used in the 1985 General Social
Survey: "From time to time, people discuss important
matters with other people.

Looking back over the last six

months - who are the people with whom you discussed matters
important to you?"
elicited.

Both first and last names were

Four other name generators were also used: "Just

counting the adults, who are the people that normally live
in this household?

Not including the people who live here,

what adult relatives do you or your husband/wife have in
the Midtown area?

Are there any people in the Midtown area

that you would consider friends or close personal
acquaintances?

How about in the Baton Rouge area.

Are

there any you would consider friends or close personal
acquaintances?"
Full names were given by 93 of the 137 respondents
(sixty-eight percent).
associates
in

First names only or descriptions of

(my sister, my friend, my neighbor) were given

27 of the 137 cases (twenty percent). Twelve percent

refused to complete this section or gave very sketchy
information such as "mostly family" or "my friends."
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The name interpreters asked respondents how long they
have known each alter; whether each associate was a
relative, whether each person lived in the household; the
neighborhood, and the city.

Next they were asked each

associate's sex and race; their degree of "closeness;"
whether they have visited the associate in the past six
months; and whether they care for each other's homes when
they are away (Fischer, 1982).
Integration into the community social network is
measured by the number of associates listed that were
recorded as living in the neighborhood.

Because both first

and last names are not needed for this measure,

120

(eighty-eight percent) of the respondents' questionnaires
are usable for measurement of this dimension.
Trust in local government was measured on a threepoint scale.

Respondents were asked "How much of the time

would you say you trust the local government? - most of the
time, some of the time, almost never."
This chapter has outlined hypotheses on the
determinants of various dimensions of security and proposed
tests of the psychological, stratification, social network,
and rational choice perspectives.

In chapter three, I show

that no single variable or perspective can completely
explain household, community, and public provision of the
good of security.
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CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS
Introduction

In this chapter, I begin by presenting descriptive
statistics for the sample.

Next I examine the

relationships among the levels of security that are used as
my three primary dependent dimensions.

I then present

descriptive statistics for the independent variables.
Finally, hypotheses that derived from the psychological,
stratification, social network, and rational choice
perspectives are tested.
Sample Characteristics

This section describes the Midtown area as, a
relatively homogeneous, older, stable, white, middle class
neighborhood.

I discuss social composition, commitment to

the community trust, and political views before turning to
attitudes on fear and violence.

For purposes of comparing

the Midtown survey sample with the city as a whole, I use a
similar survey conducted by the Louisiana State University
Center For Life Course and Population Studies.

This survey

was administered to a random sample of East Baton Rouge
Parish residents

(n=139) in October, 1994.

That survey

contained questions that parallel those used in the Midtown
survey.

In what follows, any reference to opinions or

68
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characteristics of Baton Rouge as a whole should be
construed as referring to this study unless noted.
The Midtown data come from a face-to-face survey
conducted within each household during daylight hours.
Respondents were selected by asking for "the person who
spends the most time around the house."

Women were

therefore overrepresented in this sample, comprising sixtyfour percent of the respondents as compared to the Baton
Rouge telephone poll which was forty-nine percent female.
Ninety-seven percent of the Midtown sample was non-Hispanic
white while the Baton Rouge sample was seventy-three
percent white.

The average age was fifty-three,

(ranging

from twenty-six to one hundred), while the average
respondent in the Baton Rouge poll was forty.-*

The median

household annual income range reported was between $45,000
and $60,000, well above the East Baton Rouge parish median
income of $27,224 (1990 U.S. Census) and the median income
range of $25,000 to $35,000 for the Baton Rouge poll.^
Forty-five percent of the Midtown sample owns real estate

-- Median ages were thirty-seven years for Baton Rouge and
forty-four for the Midtown area.
-- According
within in a
of $36,544.
the Midtown
in contrast
whites.

to 1990 U.S. Census, this neighborhood lies
block group with a 1989 median household income
Less than one percent of the individuals in
sample live with incomes under the poverty line
to the nine percent of East Baton Rouge Parish
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valued in excess of $75,000 and are liable for parish
property taxes.

The median duration of neighborhood

residence is fifteen years for Midtown residents as
compared to five years for East Baton Rouge Parish as a
whole.
Midtown residents are highly educated.

Only two

percent of the sample reported fewer than twelve years of
formal education, while fifty-five percent report having 16
or more years of education (college and post-graduate
degrees)
married.

Only sixty percent of the respondents were
The rest were single, divorced, or widowed.

Thirty percent of the households contain children.
Residents reported a high degree of commitment to the
Midtown neighborhood.

Seventy-five percent said they would

be very sorry to leave if for some reason they had to move
away (ninety-eight percent said they would be either very
or somewhat sorry to leave).

In response to the question

of whether Midtown residents considered their neighborhood
to be "a real home" or "just a place where they happen to
be living," ninety-six percent responded that they consider
this neighborhood to be a "real home."

This is

All respondents in the Midtown survey lived in single
family homes.
Median education completed was fourteen years for Baton
Rouge as a whole and sixteen years for the Midtown sample.
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considerably higher from the sixty percent of East Baton
Rouge Parish residents who considered their own
neighborhood a "real home."

Midtown residents are also

optimistic about the community.

When asked if they

believed their neighborhood had "become a better place to
live, stayed the same, or gotten worse in the past two
years,"

twenty-five percent reported that the neighborhood

has become a better place to live, while only five percent
reported that the neighborhood had gotten w o r s e . T e n
percent believe the neighborhood will be a better place to
live two years from now, while only three percent believe
that it will have gotten worse.
In response to a question on how many people in their
neighborhood can be trusted, seventy-five percent stated
that almost all residents can be trusted and twenty-five
percent claimed that most residents can be trusted.

Less

than one percent of the sample reported that people from
the neighborhood were responsible for most of the crime
occurring in the Midtown neighborhood.

Nearly ninety-eight

percent of the Midtown residents surveyed stated that they
believed that most crimes in the neighborhood are
perpetrated by Baton Rouge residents from other
Of the Baton Rouge sample, fourteen percent claimed that
their neighborhood was a better place to live, sixty-seven
percent said it was the same, and nineteen percent report
that the neighborhood had gotten worse.
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neighborhoods and almost two percent reported that most
crimes in Midtown are committed by residents outside of
Baton Rouge.
Seventy-four percent of Midtown residents claimed to
know at least most of their neighbors by sight and sixtythree percent claimed to know at least most of their
neighbors by name.

While these items offer some indication

of a potential sense of community, residents do not report
high levels of intimate interaction.

When asked how often

they get together with neighbors for picnics or parties,
only two percent said often and twenty-four percent said
sometimes.

A full seventy-four percent rarely or never

socialize with their neighbors.
Residents of Midtown claim to be concerned with
political issues.-®

Ninety-two percent are registered to

vote and the precinct in which the Midtown neighborhood is

Although most residents claim to be concerned with
political issues, the Midtown Neighborhood Association is
only involved with the provision of supplemental police
patrolling.
They take no official stand on any other
issue. The work of Lavrakas et al. (1981) and Podolefsky
and DuBow (1981) deals with crime prevention efforts within
community organizations.
The organization I studied does
not exist for any reason other than crime prevention.
Podolefsky and DuBow, Lavrakas et al., and the Reactions to
Crime Project advocate the idea that most citizens
participate in neighborhood based anti-crime programs as
one aspect of their participation within the community and
not because of fear of crime.
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located consistently shows higher than average turnout.-'
Fewer than nine percent of the respondents claim to follow
local government "only now and then" or "hardly at all."
Half of the Midtown residents surveyed have written or
spoken to their metropolitan council representatives or
local leaders.

As far as trust in the local government,

twenty-five percent reported trusting the local government
"most of the time," fifty-six percent "some of the time,"
and nineteen percent "almost never" trust the local
government.-®

East Baton Rouge Parish as a whole appears

to be slightly less trusting, with only fifteen percent
trusting the local government "most of the time," fortyeight percent "some of the time," and thirty-seven percent
"almost never."
Voters in this area may not be categorized as
consistently supporting or opposing all tax millages for
law enforcement.

While seventy-two percent voted in favor

of the 1993 measure that passed, fewer than half supported
the 1992 measures that failed.

Turnout for the precinct that contains the Midtown
neighborhood is twice the city average in some elections.
-® Trust may be a relative concept. Several respondents
asked whether the local government excluded the state
legislature and Governor. After the interviewer responded
that this question was only about the city-parish
government, most respondents indicated some level of trust.
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While the Midtown area has many characteristics of a
"conservative" neighborhood, political views are
represented across the spectrum.

The mean respondent score

is 4.6 on a seven-point scale on which 1 represents
extremely liberal and 7 represents extremely conservative.
This score does not differ significantly from the score of
4.4 for Baton Rouge as a whole.
Attitudes on Fear and Violence
In the past two years, only two (1.5 percent) Midtown
residents had been victimized by violent crime but nearly
twenty percent have had some type of crime committed
against their property.

An additional ten percent claimed

that others residing in their home had been victimized in
the past two years.

More than forty-four percent know

others who have been victimized.
Table 3.1
Crime Victimization
Has been a victim
crime in the past

of violent
two years

Has been a victim
crime in the past

of property
two years

Has been a victim of other crime
in the past two years
Knows neighbors that were
victimized by crime

1.5%
19.7%
10.2%
44.2%

Respondents were then asked their general opinions
concerning the safety of Baton Rouge.

Eighty-three percent
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of the sample agreed strongly or somewhat with the
statement, "Crime is the most important issue facing us
right now" (fifty percent agreed strongly; Table 3.2).
However, fear of crime and perceptions of safety are not
easily measured.

Table 3.3 describes responses to several

dimensions of fear.

No respondent described the city of

Baton Rouge as "very safe" and only one-third of the sample
described the city as "fairly safe."

In contrast, nearly

ninety-six percent described the Midtown neighborhood as
either "very" or "fairly safe," while eighty-eight percent
of Baton Rouge as a whole described their neighborhood
similarly.

Just over ninety-six percent of Midtown

residents (ninety-one percent of Baton Rouge) reported
their home to be "very" or "fairly safe," while no Midtown
residents (and only 4.3% of Baton Rouge residents)
described their home as "not safe at all."

Ninety-one

percent believed themselves to be "very" or "fairly safe."
Only twenty-eight percent stated that they ever worry about
the safety of young children (under 12) playing outside
around here (Table 3.4).--

Some of the respondents replying in the affirmative
stated that they were primarily concerned about the safety
of children playing in the street being hit by cars.
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Table 3.2
Significance of Crime Issue

Crime is the Most
Important Issue

Agree
Strongly

Agree
Somewhat

Disagree
Strongly

Disagree
Somewhat

50.0%

32.8%

14.8%

2.3%

Table 3.3"
Assessment of Area Safety
Very
Safe

Fairly
Safe

Not Very
Safe

Not Safe
At All

0.0%

34.8%

60.7%

4.4%

Neighborhood
Safety

25.2%

70.4%

3.7%

0.7%

Home Safety

35.0%

61.3%

3.6%

0.0%

Personal Safety

25.9%

65.2%

8.1%

0.7%

Baton Rouge Safety

Table 3.4
Fear of Crime

Worry about safety of
children playing in area
Afraid to walk alone in
area at night

Yes

No

28.0

72.0

84.7 15.3

In sum, respondents feel they reside in a safe
neighborhood in a dangerous city.

Though the neighborhood

is reported to be safe, most respondents believe that areas
surrounding their neighborhood may be dangerous.

Eighty-

five percent of Midtown residents interviewed responded

Among the 187 places in the United States with
populations above 100,000, Baton Rouge was ranked the 8th
most dangerous city in America, in terms of violent crime
rates (Updegrave, 1994).
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affirmatively to the questions: "Is there any area right
around here— that is, within a mile— where you would be
afraid to walk alone at night?" in contrast to fifty-two
percent of the East Baton Rouge Parish sample.
Table 3.5 lists affirmative responses to avoidance
measures.

Thirty-nine percent reported going out alone,

nearly forty-three percent avoided going out at night, and
eighty-eight percent avoided certain places in the city.^

Table 3.5
Avoidance Measures
Avoid

going out alone

38.8%

Avoid

going out at night

42.5%

Avoid

going certain places in the city

88.0%

Table 3.6 shows protective measures taken since moving
into their home.

Precautionary measures already on the

home before they moved in were not included.

Twenty-nine

percent installed an alarm system, sixty-nine percent
installed deadbolt locks on their doors, and twenty-one
This disparity in the samples may be at least partially
explained by the overrepresentation of elderly and female
respondents in the Midtown survey. However, it may be more
likely that the difference in fear of surrounding areas
comes from the location of the Midtown neighborhood near
poor (and high crime) neighborhoods in the central city.
The Baton Rouge survey asked a question "Thinking about
the neighborhoods in Baton Rouge, are there any you go out
of your way to avoid driving through?" Sixty-four percent
responded "yes."
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percent purchased a dog for protection.
(seventy-one percent)

Most residents

installed outside lighting and

fifteen percent installed a security fence.

Four out of

five respondents reported leaving a television, radio, or
lights on when they go out.
weapon for protection.^

One out of six purchased a

Thirty-six percent installed

locks on their windows.
Table 3.6
Protective measures
Purchased an alarm system

29.2

Installed deadbolt locks

68.7

Has dog for protection

21.2

Installed outside lighting

70.5

Installed security fence

14.5

Leave TV, radio, or lights

onwhen out

79.5

Purchased weapon for protection

16.2

Installed locks on windows

35.9

Owning a dog for protection is a matter of definition.
Some owners of small dogs claimed that the dogs aided in
security, while other owners claimed that their dogs
offered no security.
Forty-one percent of Midtown residents reported owning a
gun of some type. Thirty-nine percent of these gun owners
reported that the gun was primarily for protection and
thirty-one percent said that the gun was for both hunting
and protection. While forty-nine percent of Baton Rouge as
a whole reported gun ownership, only thirty-one percent of
the gun owners claimed that the gun was primarily for
protection and thirty percent for both hunting and
protection. Though Midtown residents are slightly less
likely to own a gun, they are more likely to own the gun
for protection.
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Turning to community-level security. Midtown
Neighborhood Association records show that dues payment
participation has fluctuated from fifty to eighty percent
since the inception of the organization.

In January of

1994, about seventy percent of households in the Midtown
area paid dues while seventy-six percent of those surveyed
had paid dues.^
Macro-level security actions are indicated by voting
behavior.

Overall, this neighborhood is more supportive of

the city's law enforcement agencies than the rest of the
parish (city police and parish sheriff's office; Table
3.7).

Only six percent of the Midtown residents disagreed

somewhat and no one strongly disagreed with the statement,
"the police and deputies generally do a good job in Baton
Rouge," while nineteen percent of those sampled in the East
Baton Rouge Parish survey disagreed somewhat or strongly.
Only two percent of the Midtown residents disagreed
strongly or somewhat with the statement that "the police
and deputies generally do a good job in this neighborhood,"
while seventeen percent disagreed somewhat or strongly in
the parish.

Eighty-seven percent support (strongly or

somewhat) increased revenue for local law enforcement

Respondents were not significantly more likely to be MNA
members than non-respondents (chi-square = 3.43, not
significant at .05 level).
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agencies.

Eighty percent agreed strongly or somewhat that

"more money needs to be spent on law enforcement in order
to reduce the incidence of crime."

Not only do residents

of this neighborhood support the local law enforcement
agencies, but they also show great support for the concept
of the "neighborhood beat cop."

Over two-thirds strongly

agreed with the statement "it would be better if the same
police officers patrolled this neighborhood all the time
and the people knew who

they were"(a total of ninety-three

percent agreed stronglyor somewhat to this statement).
When asked who is responsible for the crimes committed
in the Midtown neighborhood, only 0.8 percent responded
that it is residents in the neighborhood while over 99
percent reported that people from outside the neighborhood
commit the crimes.
Racial attitudes are often difficult to measure.
inquired about opinions
opinions on racial fear,

We

on several race-related issues.

In

sixty-onepercent of the

respondents agreed strongly or somewhat with the statement
that "most whites fear blacks," while only thirty-one
percent agreed strongly or somewhat with the statement that

The Midtown sample is similar to the city as a whole.
Sixty-three percent agreed strongly and eighty-four agreed
either strongly or somewhat having the same police
patrolling their home neighborhood.
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Table 3.7
Police Issues
Somewhat

Disagree
Strongly

Disagree
Somewhat

38.1

56.0

6.0

0.0

Police do a good
job in this
ne ighbo rhood

52.2

45.5

2.2

0.0

More money should
be spent on law
enforcement

34.6

45.7

13.4

6.3

Better if the
same police
patrolled this
area all the time

67.2

26.2

4 .1

2.5

Ay r c 6

Ay 2T£ £

strongly
Police do a good
job in Baton
Rouge

Do police pay more, less,
or same attention to this
neighborhood as others

How often do you see
police in this
neighborhood

"most blacks fear whites."

More

Same

Less

26.4

39.7

33.9

Often

Some

Almost
Never

33.1

25.6

41.3

Only thirty-three percent

agreed with the statement that the government should not
make any special effort to help minorities.
In political issues related to both race and crime,
twenty-seven percent agreed that "the police are too hard
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Table 3.8
Race-Related Opinions
Agree
Strongly

Agree
Somewhat

Disagree
Somewhat

Disagree
Strongly

Most whites fear
blacks

14.8

45.1

31.3

7.8

Most blacks fear
whites

2.4

29.0

42.7

25.8

Govt, should not
make special
efforts to help
minorities

8.6

24.2

45.3

21.9

Police are too
hard on blacks

3.3

24.0

32.2

40.5

Courts are harder
on blacks than
whites

6.8

25.4

33.1

34.7

Blacks have too
little influence
in Baton Rouge

11.7

16.7

37.5

34.4

People can refuse
to sell home to
anyone they
choose

46.6

29.6

11.5

12.2

on blacks" and thirty-two percent agreed with the statement
that "the courts in this area are harder on blacks than
they are on whites."

Seventy-two percent of the

respondents disagreed with the statement "blacks have too
little influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge."
In a question dealing with property rights, 7 6 percent
agreed with the statement that "people have the right to
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refuse to sell their property to anyone they choose, black
or white ."
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.9 presents simple descriptive statistics for
the dependent variables in the analysis.

Residents average

1.7 of the three avoidance measures, 3.3 of the nine
protective measures, and 5 of the 12 total household
measures that could be taken (see Appendix A ) .

At the

neighborhood level, 75.6 percent of the eligible residents
of the community paid membership dues for the civic
association in January,

1994.--

Though the first two tax

referenda failed, fifty-eight percent of the respondents
reported voting in favor of the first sheriff's tax
referendum and fifty-five percent of the sample reported
voting for the second (July, 1992).

In contrast, eighty

percent of the sample voted in favor of the sheriff's tax
referendum (October, 1993), which passed by a two-to-one
margin.

In all three elections. Midtown's electoral

support for the taxes exceeded the citywide outcome by
about twenty percent.

This discovery supports

Some respondents disagreeing with this statement claimed
that they disagreed with this statement only because there
is a law forbidding this practice.
I use the month of January, 1994, to indicate
association membership because it is the midpoint of data
collection.
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Table 3.9
Simple Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
(n=137i
Mean
std
No. of avoidance measures
1.7
1.04
No. of protective measures

3.3

1.64

No. of household measures

5.0

2.11

Percentages
Paid neighborhood assn. dues

7 5.6%

Voted for the January 1992
sheriff's tax

58.0%

Voted for the July 1992
police tax
Voted for the October 1993
sheriff's tax

55.1%
80.0%

Wilson and Banfield's (1964) claim that more affluent areas
are actually more likely than most other areas to support
increased municipal taxes.

Midtown residents were about

twice as likely as residents of other areas to participate
in these moderately low turnout elections.
Table 3.10 presents descriptive statistics for the
independent variables to be used in testing the hypotheses.
Though the neighborhood is more affluent than the city and
parish averages, fifty-five percent are exempt from paying
any parish property tax.
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Table 3.10
Simple Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Standard
Mean
Deviation
Demographic Percentages
Exempt from Parish Property taxes
55.3%
Non-Demographic Percentage
Afraid to Walk Alone in Area
84.7%
Non-Demographic Means
Number of Associates Living in
2.40
2.27
Neighborhood
Black Influence Score
2.95
.99
(l=too little, 4=too much)
Political ideology score
4.57
1.53
(l=very liberal, 7=very conservative)
Trust in local government
1.95
.56
(l=most of the time, 3=almost never)

An average of only 2.7 associates listed were
residents of the Midtown neighborhood.^-

This does not

mean that residents are isolates locked inside their homes,
but that needs of daily living are often fulfilled outside
of the neighborhood (Wellman, 1979; Wellman and Wortley,
1990).

The average respondent disagreed somewhat with the

statement that "blacks have too little influence in the
life and politics of Baton Rouge."

Marsden (1987) reports that the 1985 General Social
Survey mean and mode are three associates listed by the
respondent. The names generated by this study are focused
more on those residing within the boundary of the Midtown
neighborhood.
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Analysis
Levels of Security

The first issue to be addressed is the question of
whether various levels of security measures are
substitutional or complementary.

Does taking security

precautions at one level reduce or increase the likelihood
of support for security measures at other levels?

An

argument can be made that one type of security lessens the
need for other types of security.

This substitutional

argument claims that participating in one level of security
actually eliminates the necessity of participating in
another level of security.

A substitutional argument would

lead to the expectation of negative relationships between
micro, meso, and macro security measures.

Alternatively,

the complementary argument claims that some people value
security more highly than others and, hence, the adoption
of one type of security should be positively related to
support for another type of security.

If micro, meso, and

macro security measures are all positively related, then
these relationships support the complementary argument.
Correlations between indicators do not offer clear and
consistent support for either argument.

Contrary to the

predicted direction of hypothesis #1 but supporting the
substitutional argument, those residents taking more
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security measures in and around their home are
significantly less likely to support the tax referenda.
However, residents taking a larger number of security
measures are more likely to pay dues to the neighborhood
association.

There appears to be no significant

relationship between membership in the neighborhood
organization and support for the tax referenda.
Thus, there is partial support for the complementary
argument.

The data show a significant positive

relationship between the number of individual/household
security measures taken and paying Midtown Neighborhood
association dues (r = .245, p = .039).

This finding

supports the complementary argument that dues paying is
either complementary at all levels or dues paying is an
individual level decision just as other
individual/household measures.
Neither the complementary nor the substitutional
argument presents a simple explanation of observed
relationships between security practices.

Nor does either

provide a solution applicable to all combinations of
levels.

Micro and meso levels of security appear to be

complementary, while together these are substitutional with
respect to macro-level security.
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Table 3.11 presents the zero-order correlation
coefficients for variables used in suggesting a reversal of
direction for the hypothesis stating that residents taking
more security measures in and around their home will be
more likely to support the tax referenda.

Data from the

first two elections show a strong negative relationship
between the number of household security precautions and
support for the tax referendum, while the third election
(October, 1993) shows no significant relationship. The
October 1993 election differs from the other two elections
in that the city-parish government and the sheriff's office
presented a well-organized public relations and advertising
campaign that was absent in the previous two elections.
The value of public relations and advertising is difficult
to measure and will not be explored in this dissertation.
Instead, I interpret this negative relationship in two out
of the three elections as support for a substitutional
account of the relationship between micro and macro
security provision.

Voting participation was not significant in any of the
three elections.
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Table 3.11
Correlation Table of Household Security Measures and Tax
X,
Household
security measures

X,

1.000

Jan.

'92 Vote

X;

-.335'

July '92 Vote

X,

-.299'

X,
1.000

%3
1.000

X,

.862"
Oct.

'93 Vote

X,

.611"

-.054

.421"

1.000

■p< .05
"p<.01

Tables 3.12a, 3.12b, and 3.12c show that the
association between paying MNA dues and support for each of
the tax referenda is not significantly different from

Table 3.12a
MNA dues payment status bv Vote in January,
referendum

1992 tax

Pays Neighborhood
Association Dues

Vote in January
1992 Sheriff's
Tax Election

= 0.292
Probability X

No

Yes

8

22

66.67%

57.89%

4

16

33.33%

42.11%

12

38

30

For
20

Against

= .589
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Table 3.12b
MNA dues payment status by Vote in July, 1992 tax
referendum
Pays Neighborhood
Association Dues

Vote in July
1992 Police Tax
Election

X" = 0.002
Probability X

No

Yes

7

22

63.64%

62.86%

4

13

36.36%

37 .14%

11

35

29

For
17

Against

= .963

Table 3.12c
MNA dues payment status by Vote in October.
referendum

1993 tax

Pays Neighborhood
Association Dues

Vote in October
1993 Sheriff's
Tax Election

= 0.158
Probability X

chance.

No

Yes

10

32

83.33%

78.05%

2

9

16.67%

21.95%

12

41

42

For
11

Against

= .691

Neither substitutional nor complementary

explanations for security are supported by this finding.
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Though paying neighborhood association dues and voting in
municipal policing tax referenda are individual decisions,
they represent contributions to collective goods that
cannot be explained simply by placing a value on the good
of security.

Later in this chapter, I will explore other

factors that may influence security provision at meso and
macro levels.
Figure 1 illustrates observed relationships between
security practices, showing that no simple conclusion can
be made about relationships among all types of security
measures.

Residents taking more individual/household

security measures are more likely to contribute to
neighborhood protection.

This supports the complementary

approach to understanding security practices.

On the other

hand, the data show that individual level security
provision is substitutional with respect to contributions
to municipal security, since residents taking more security
measures at the individual level are less likely to support
tax referenda for law enforcement at the municipal level.
These two seemingly opposite findings add to the complexity
of the problem of security provision.

Also, the lack of

relationship between paying MNA dues and electoral support
for the municipal level referenda supports the idea that
more exploration must be done beyond offering the
parsimonious theory that security provision is
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complementary at all levels.

The problem of security

cannot be understood through substitutional or
complementary arguments alone.
Psychological
The psychological explanation of security provision
views security as a product of the absence of fear.

The

hypotheses in this section examine the relationship between
fear of crime and adoption of different types of practices
related to security.

Table 3.13 presents zero-order

correlations between fear of crime and the number of
avoidance measures taken.

Hypothesis 4a predicted a strong

positive relationship between fear of crime and the number
of avoidance measures taken.

Hypothesis 4b predicted a

weak positive relationship between fear of crime and the
Table 3.13
Correlation Table of Fear of Victimization, Number of
Avoidance Measures Taken, and Number of Protective Measures
Taken
X,
Afraid to walk
alone

X,

Number of
avoidance
measures

X, .313*'

Number of
protective
measures

X, .050

1.000
Xj
.209*

1.000

■p<.05
**p<.01

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

94

number of protective measures taken.

Fear of crime is

strongly related to the number of avoidance measures taken
(r = .313, p = .0002) but there is no significant
relationship between fear of victimization and the number
of protective measures taken (r = .050, p = .577) .
Hypothesis 5 predicted that fear of crime will not be
related significantly to neighborhood association
Table 3.14
Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Pavment of MNA
Dues
Afraid to Walk Alone at
Night in Neighborhood
No

Yes

6

13

40.00%

20.63%

9

50

60.00%

79.37%

15

63

19

No
Pays Neighborhood
Association Dues
Yes

X- = 2.4 66
Probability Xt

membership.

= .116

Table 3.14 shows that fear of crime is not

related significantly to payment of neighborhood
association dues.

Though the relationship is positive,

the strength of the relationship is not statistically
significant.

I interpret this finding as the Midtown

Neighborhood Association being viewed as a protective
measure which is less influenced by fear of crime.
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Tables 3.15a-c show that individuals who fear crime
mere strongly are not significantly more likely to support
the security tax referenda.

These findings contradict

Table 3.15a
Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the
January, 1992 Tax Referendum
Afraid to Walk Alone at
Night in Neighborhood

Vote in January
1992 Sheriff's
Tax Election

X" =

No

Yes

7

40

53.85%

58.82%

6

28

46.15%

41.18%

13

68

47

For
34

Against

.111

Probability

= .739

Table 3.15b
Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the
July, 1992 Tax Referendum
Afraid to Walk Alone at
Night in Neighborhood

Vote in July
1992 Police Tax
Election

No

Yes

5

38

45.45%

56.72%

6

29

54.55%

43.28%

11

67

Against

= .484
Probability X^

43

For

= .486
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Table 3.15c
Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the
October. 1993 Tax Referendum
Afraid to Walk Alone at
Night in Neighborhood

Vote in October
1993 Sheriff's
Tax Election

No

Yes

9

59

64.29%

83.10%

5

12

35.71%

16.90%

14

71

68

For
17

Against

= 2.587
Probability "X: = .108

hypothesis

6,

which predicted a positive relationship

between fear and electoral support for the referenda.
Political ideology may have a stronger effect on anti
tax sentiment than law and order issues.

Self-described

conservatives were significantly more likely to vote
against the first municipal tax referendum and were nearly
so (p = .102) in the second election.

While race has often

been described as synonymous with politics in the South,
Midtown residents' attitude about black influence in the
life and politics of Baton Rouge is not significantly
related to electoral decisions in the security tax against
the first municipal tax referenda and were nearly so (p =
.102) in the second election.

While race has often been

described as synonymous with politics in the South, Midtown
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residents' attitude about black influence in the referenda.
Therefore, describing opposition to the tax based on
opposition to funding security in other neighborhoods may
not be a viable explanation for opposition to the policing
tax referenda.
Table 3.16
Racial Attitude, and Vote in Tax Referenda
Xi
Political
Ideology

X,

1.000

X:

Black Influence

X;

.190*

1.000

Jan.

'92 Vote

X]

.2 2 2 *

.092 1.000

July '92 Vote

X<

.189

.034

.862"

1.000

Oct.

X5

.094

.130

.511**

.421"

'93 Vote

Xj
X,
Xc

'p<.05
"p < . 0 1

The psychological approach explains only a very small
part of the problem of security.

Fear of victimization

fails to explain the adoption of protective security
measures, membership in a neighborhood security
association, and voting behavior on security issues.

Fear

of crime does seem to be related to the number of avoidance
measures taken.
Stratification
Table 3.17 shows a lack of relationship between life
course status characteristics and household security
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measures.

Hypotheses

8 a,

8 b,

9a, and 9b were not supported

as correlation coefficients are very low, suggesting that
being married or having children residing in the
respondent's home apparently does not affect the number of
Table 3.17
Correlation Table of Family Status Characteristics, Number
of Avoidance Measures Taken, and Number of Protective
Measures Taken
X:
Married

X-,

1.000

X,

Children

Xn

.270’*

1.000

Number of Avoidance
Measures

X,

-.022

-.052

Number of Protective
Measures

X.;

.009

.028

X,
1.000

X.

.209'

1.000

’d < . 05
"p < . 0 1

Table 3.18a
Crosstabulation of Resoondent's Marital Status and Payment
of MNA Dues
Married Head of
Household
No

Yes

9

10

19

No
28.13%

Pays Neighborhood
Association Dues

22

.2 2 %

23

35

71.88%

77.78%

32

45

58

Yes

= 0.351
Probability X~

= .554
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Table 3.18b
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and MNA
Dues Pav'TT.ent
Children Residing in
Household
No

Yes

12

7

28.13%

22.22%

45

13

71.88%

77.78%

32

45

19

No
Pavs Neighborhood
Association Dues

58

Yes

= 1.550
Probability Xr

77

= .213

avoidance or protective measures taken.

These findings

question the impact of altruistic fear on household level
security actions.
There is also no significant relationship between
marital status, the presence of children, or educational
attainment, and membership in the community security
organization (Tables 3.18a, 3.18b).
As hypothesis 10c predicts, there is no significant
relationship between educational attainment and
neighborhood association membership.

However, I note the

direction of education on payment of MNA dues (r=-.15) .
Education is not a life course status characteristic.
is a socioeconomic status characteristic.

Those

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

It

100

respondents with more education are less likely to pay MNA
dues.
Hypothesis 11 predicted that there would be no
relationship between tax liability and electoral support
for the tax referenda.

Residents with parish property tax

liability are often more likely to vote against property
taxes than those residents owning property valued at less
than $75,000.

In this case, residents who are exempt from

parish property tax were more likely to vote for the tax.
Like much of the data, the first two elections that
involved similar outcomes operate similarly (tables 3.19a
and 3.19b).

The January parishwide sheriff's election v/as

voted down like the July citywide police election.

Though

the homestead exemption has a significant effect in both
elections, it is interesting to note that the homestead
exemption covers parish property taxes and does not exempt
residents from city property taxes.

All property owners

are assessed the property tax millage in the July, 1992
election.

Those with parish tax liability have higher tax

assessments and greater city property tax liability.

Inferences drawn from this finding may be limited due to
the lack of testing other socioeconomic status variables.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

101

Table 3.19a
Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in
January. 1992 Tax Referendum
Exempt from Parish
Property Taxes
Yes

No

29

17

74.36%

50.00%

10

17

25.64%

50.00%

39

34

46

For

Vote in January
1992 Sheriff's
Tax Election

27

Against

= 4.624
Probability

= .032

Table 3.19b
Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in
July, 1992 Tax Referendum
Exempt from Parish
Property Taxes

Vote in July 1992
Police Tax Election

Yes

No

26

15

70.271

45.45%

11

18

29.73%

54.55%

37

33

41

For
29

Against

= 4.427
Probability

= .035

Though Midtown neighborhood residents are significantly
more affluent than the average Baton Rouge community and
more likely to support the municipal policing tax millages,
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Table 3.19c
Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in
October. 1993 Tax Referendum
Exempt From Parish
Property Taxes

Vote in October
1993 Sheriff's
Tax Election

= 2.263
Probability

No

Yes

40

26

83.33%

78.05%

4

7

16.67%

21.95%

44

33

66

For
11

Against

= .133

residents with greater tax liability in the community are
more likely to oppose the tax millages.

The October,

1993

election does not show a statistically significant
relationship but is in the predicted direction.
In analyzing the city and parish elections, there was
no significant relationship between the life course status
characteristics of being married or the presence of
children in the home.

Educational attainment shows a

marginally significant positive relationship with support
for the first tax election (r = .2 1 1 , p = .060) and the
second tax election (r = .226, p = .048).
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Table 3.20a
Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in
January. 1992 Tax Referendum.
Married Head of
Household

Vote in January
1992 Sheriff's*
Tax Election

=

Yes

No

25

21

66.67*

57.89%

22

11

33.33%

42.11%

47

32

46

For
33

Against

1.210

Probability

= .271

Table 3.20b
Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in
July. 1992 Tax Referendum
Married Head of
Household

Vote in July 1992
Police Tax Election

Yes

No

22

20

47.83%

64.52%

24

11

52.17%

35.48%

46

31

42

For
35

Against

X= = 2.081
Probability X^

= .149
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Table 3.20c
Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in
October. 1993 Tax Referendum
Married Head of
Household

Vote in October
1993 Sheriff's
Tax Election

= 2.541
Probability

Yes

No

37

30

74.00%

88.24%

13

4

26.00%

11.76%

50

34

67

For
17

Against

=

.111

Table 3.21a
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and
Vote in January. 1992 Tax Referendum
Children Residing
in Household

Vote in January
1992 Sheriff's
Tax Election

X' = 0.450
Probability

Yes

No

13

33

66.67%

57.89%

12

22

33.33%

42.11%

25

55

46

For
34

Against

= .502
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Table 3.21b
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and
Vote in July, 1992 Tax Referendum
Children Residing
in Household

Vote in July 1992
Police Tax Election

Yes

No

15

27

55.56%

54.00%

12

23

44.44%

46.00%

27

50

42

For
35

Against

= 0.017
Probability Xr

= .896

Table 3.21c
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and
Vote in October, 1993 Tax Referendum
Children Residing
in Household

Vote in October
1993 Sheriff's
Tax Election

Xr = 1.328
Probability X!^

Yes

No

18

49

83.33%

78.05%

7

10

16.67%

21.95%

25

59

57

For
17

Against

= .249
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Table 3.22
Correlation Table of Respondents Education and Vote in Tax
Referenda
Xi
X,

Education

X.

1.000

Jan.

X,

.211

July '92 Vote

X 3

.226"

.862"

Oct. '93 Vote

X,

.093

.611"

'92 Vote

1.000

X 3

X,

1.000

.421"

1.000

'p< .05
"p < . 0 1

While life course status characteristics do not appear
to be related significantly to security provision,
socioeconomic status characteristics merit further study.
However, the effect of socioeconomic status is not easy to
determine owing to the homogeneity of the neighborhood.
Status characteristics of neighborhoods are related to
differences in neighborhoods' abilities to organize and
respond to crime (Skogan, 1990).
The Midtown neighborhood is more affluent than most
other neighborhoods in the city and parish, supporting an
ongoing neighborhood protection program and showing greater
than average support for municipal policing tax referenda.
The socioeconomic status argument of Wilson and Banfield
also receives some support from the finding that more
educated respondents are more likely to pay MNA dues and
support increased taxes for municipal policing
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improvements.

However, socioeconomic status is not a

consistent explanation owing to the negative relationship
between tax liability and support for the same tax
referenda.
Social Networks
Surprising results were found in examining the
relationship between Midtown resident's neighborhood
networks and household security provision.

Better

integrated residents are more likely to associate with
their neighbors.

Hypothesis 13a predicted that individuals

who were more integrated into the community would take
fewer avoidance measures, while hypothesis 13b predicted no
relation between integration and number of household
protective measures.

An individual's network size is

measured by the number of associates in the area listed in
response to social network questions.

Network size is a

dimension of range (Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert,

1986),

or a measure of access to potential resources and
integration.

The larger the network the more potential

resources.
Integration is not related to the number of avoidance
measures taken (r = -.001, p = .994).
product of opposing causal mechanisms.

This may be a
The safety of

familiarity within an area and the knowledge of
neighborhood gossip about crime victimization may work in
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opposite directions to cancel any overall effects of
integration.

However, the degree of interpersonal

integration into the community social network is related to
the number of protective measures taken.

The more

integrated a community resident is, the fewer protective
measures they take (r = -.253, p .007) .

Though some may

argue that residents less integrated in the community are
more likely to take protective measures because limited
knowledge of the area increases uncertainty and fear (Warr,
1990), fear is not related significantly to the number of
protective measures taken.

Instead,

I suggest that less

integrated individuals are less likely to use their
neighbors as security resources.

Trust in neighbors leads

to less reliance on other forms of protection.
Table 3.23
Correlation Table of Number of Associates in Area Listed by
Respondent. Number of Avoidance Measures Taken and Number
of Protective Measures Taken
X.
Number of
Associates in
Area

X,

1.000
Xg

Number of
avoidance
measures

X.

Number of
protective
measures

X3

-.001

1.000

Xj
-.253"

.209'

1.000

■p<.05
"p < . 0 1
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Though I expected to find that integrated residents
would be more likely to contribute to their neighborhood
association, the data show no significant relationship
between integration in the community social network and
paying MNA dues (r=.085).

The MNA is not composed

primarily of individuals with friends in the neighborhood.
Hypothesis 15 predicted no relationship between integration
and electoral support for the tax referenda.
hypothesis is supported.

This

Integration in the community does

not lead to support for, or against municipal policing
referenda.
Table 3.24
Correlation Table of Number of Associates in Area Listed bv
Resoondent,
Pavment of MNA Dues, and Vote in Tax Referenda
Xi
Number of
Associates in
Area

X.

1.000

X.

Pays MNA Dues

X,

.085

1.000

Jan. '92 Vote

X3

.020

.076

July '92 Vote

X,

.067

.007

.862**

1.000

Xs

Oct. '93 Vote

X:

.095

.055

.611**

.421**

1.000

X]
1.000

X,

'p<.05
"p<.01

Rational Choice
Multivariate analysis is used to examine the extent to
which psychological, stratification, and social network
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factors affect support for each level of security.

First,

micro-level security practices are considered, followed by
multivariate models for community and municipal security
actions.

Table 3.25 shows that fear of victimization is

related significantly to the avoidance index while other
variables are not significantly related to avoidance.

Table 3.25
Rearession of Avoidance Measures on Selected Variables
Independent
Variable

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Intercept
Walk alone at night
Trust local govt.
Black influence
Married
Children in home
Education
tf assoc, in area
Respondent's age

3.41
0.13"
-0 . 2 2
-0 . 1 2
-0.03
-0.06
0.02
0.01

0.03

Std.
Error

Prob > T

0.81
0.27
0.15

0.001

0.10
0.21

0.24
0.04
0.04
0.04

0.008
0.126
0.250
0.895
0.796
0.601
0.796
0.496

R- = .151
F = 2.106
Prob > F .043
Variance inflation factor coefficients are all below 1.5
suggesting no significant collinearity problem among
independent variables.
p < .05
" p < .01

Table 3.26 presents a regression of the index of
protective measures on selected independent variables.
While adding a few more variables could allow the
multivariate model to approach a higher level of
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significance, I present a simple model for two reasons.
First, this model presents a direct comparison to the
analysis of avoidance measures taken.

Second, with a small

number of cases, assumptions made on any finding with a
larger number of independent variables would be
questionable.

While fear of victimization affects the

number of avoidance measures taken, fear is not related to
the number of protective measures taken.
One relationship that merits further study is the
negative association between the number of neighborassociates and the number of protective measures taken.
This zero-order relationship remains after controlling for
the other exogenous factors in the multiple regression
model: those residents listing more neighbors as associates
took fewer protective measures.

The relationship between

fear of victimization and number of protective measures
taken remains insignificant.

This lack of relationship

leads me to question the effect of the neighborhood social
network on protective security measures.

Where Skogan

(1977) claimed that integration into the neighborhood leads
to greater fear of crime through increased neighborhood
gossip and knowledge about crimes committed in the
neighborhood, I claim that fear of victimization is not a
mediating effect in the integration - security
relationship.
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Table 3.26
Regression of Protective Measures on Selected Variables
Independent
Variable

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Intercept
Walk alone at night
Trust local govt.
Black influence
Married
Children in home
Education
# assoc, in area
Respondent's age

Std.
Error

Frob > T

12.50'
-0.28
-0.34
0.07
0.19
-0.48
0.06
-0.15'

1.33
0.44
0.24
0.17
0.34
0.40
0.07
0.07

0.532
0.163
0.681
0.573
0.233
0.379
0.034

0.02

0.01

0.120

0.001

R- = .134
F = 1.746
Prob > F .099
Variance inflation factor coefficients are all below 1.5
suggesting no significant collinearity problem among
independent variables.
p < .05
p < .01
Because the model analyzing payment of MNA dues is not
significant

(F Value = 0.466, p = .890), its results cannot

be interpreted.

Controlling for several variables in the

multiple regression model duplicates the failure of zeroorder analysis which failed to show any significant
relationship between paying MNA dues and any variable in
this study.

I find no support for the hypothesis that fear

of victimization and integration in a social network of
neighbors contributes to the maintenance of community
organizations.
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Table 3.27
Logistic Regression of Association Membership on Selected
V a iab 10 S
Independent
Parameter
Std.
Prob >
Variable
Estimate
Error
Chi-Square
2.98
Intercept
Walk alone at night -0.72
0.04
Trust local govt.
0.10
Black influence
0.45
Married
1.40*
Children in home
0.13
Education
# assoc, in area
0.03
Prop, tax exemption - 0 . 0 2
Cons. Pol. ideology -0. 87

3.20
0.84
0.57
0.37
0.86

0.77
0.15
0.14
0.28
0.76

0.352
0.390
0.950
0.798
0.600
0.068
0.379
0.849
0.957
0.249

9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi -Square for
Covariates = 31.11 (p *< .0 0 1 )
p < .10
p < .05 "* p < . 0 1

Once again, relationships among variables predicting
support for each of the three tax referenda are similar in
most respects.

Fear of victimization has a near

significant effect on voting decisions in the October 1993
election but not on decisions in the other elections.
Trust in local government also yields ambiguous results.
Though electoral support for the January and July elections
are strongly related, their relationship with trust in
local government differs as trust in government appears to
be a more salient issue in the sheriff's elections

(January

1992 and October 1993) than the city police election (July
1992) .

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

114

Education shows a marginal or significant positive
relationship in each model.

However,

I must note that the

variability in socioeconomic dimensions such as education
is low.

In analyzing the tax votes, I added one variable,

property tax exempt status, to each of the models, and
eliminated respondent's age, which showed no significant
relationship in voting for the referenda.

Property tax

liability is significant in two out of three elections.
The positive coefficient for property tax liability
indicates that those who are tax exempt are more likely to
vote in favor of increased taxes.
Table 3.28
Loaistic Rearession of Vote in Januarv 1992 tax referendum
on Selected Variables
Std.
Independent
Parameter
Prob >
Error
Estimate
Variable
Chi-Square
4.09
Intercept
Walk alone at night 0.60
Trust local govt.
1.82"'
Black influence
-0.09
Married
1.55
-1.30
Children in home
0.35"
Education
# assoc, in area
0.02
1 .6 8 "
Prop, tax exemption
Cons. Pol. ideology -0.55

3 .39
0.02

.6 6
0.37
1.05
0.82
0.17
0.14
0.77
0.34
0

0.228
0.553
0.006
0.809
0.139
0.110

0.039
0.902
0.030
0.105

9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 31.11 (p < .0 0 1 )
p < .10
p < .05 "• p < . 0 1
Other variables in the models do not aid in explaining
voting behavior.

Life course status characteristics of
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marriage and children residing in the home offer no
predictive value.

The neighborhood network variable is

Table 3.29
Loaistic Rearession of Vote in Julv 1992 tax referendum on
Selected Variables
Parameter
Prob >
Independent
Std.
Estimate
Variable
Error
Chi-Square
Intercept
Walk alone @ night
Trust local govt.
Black influence
Married
Children in home
Education
# assoc, in area
Prop, tax exemption
Cons. Pol. ideology

-1.35
0.43
0.15
-0.05
-0.08
0.20
0.34"
-0.16
1 .62”
-0.03

2.93
0.93
0.45
0.33
0.73
0.67
0.15
0.14
0.66
0.24

0.646
0.642
0.737
0.886
0.918
0.7 67
0.021
0.272
0.015
0.886

9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 17.59 (p = .040)
• p < .10
p < .05
p < .01
Table 3.30
Loaistic Rearession of Vote in October 1993 tax referendum
on Selected Variables
Std.
Independent
Parameter
Prob >
Variable
Estimate
Error
Chi-Square
Intercept
3.69
2 .10'
Walk alone 0 night
1.54'
Trust local govt.
Black influence
0.04
-1.33
Married
-1.00
Children in home
Education
0.40'
-0.15
# assoc, in area
Prop, tax exemption 1.42
Cons. Pol. ideology 0.38

4.16
1.13
0.83
0.47
1.23
0.94
0.21
0.17
0.92
0.34

0.376
0.063
0.065
0.928
0.277
0.286
0.054
0.391
0.123
0.265

9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 19.52 (p = .021)
* p < .10
p < .05 *” p < .01
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also unrelated to voting decisions.

Opinions on black

influence in government are insignificant and conservative
political ideology loses its zero-order significance when
placed in a model with other control variables.
Discussion

Analysis of Midtown residents' survey responses
supports my claim that security provision is not a simple
matter of complementarity or substitutionality.

Though

security may be perceived as freedom from threat, fear of
victimization is not related significantly to support for,
or adoption of several types of security measures.

At the

household level, fear of victimization influences avoidance
measures but is not related to the number of protective
measures taken.

Adoption of a greater number of protective

measures is related to knowing more neighbors.
The major puzzle is the absence of any significant
associations with Midtown Neighborhood Association dues
paying.

Possibly, the structure of the organization

creates a set of influences that are unique from that of
other organizations.

The recent growth of organizations

which require monetary contributions and no time commitment
is a field which deserves more study (Putnam, 1995).
Electoral support for the municipal property tax
millages varies slightly across the three elections.
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however,

I find that life course status characteristics

such as education and property tax liability are be related
to electoral decisions.
Overall, the psychological approach to understanding
security contributes to understanding micro-level avoidance
behaviors, the social network perspective contributes to
understanding micro-level protective behaviors, and the
stratification approach aids in understanding the macro
level municipal tax referenda voting behaviors.

Rational

choice theory, which is designed to explain collective
goods provision through a combination of psychological,
social network, and stratification factors, fails to
explain the meso-level behavior of membership in the
Midtown Neighborhood association.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
Introduction

Fear of crime is significantly related to individuals'
personal avoidance measures.

Having a greater number of

associates in the neighborhood was related to taking fewer
protective measures in and around the home.

No variables

were signigficantly related to support for contributions to
the community crime-prevention organization other than a
positive relationship between household measures and dues
payment.

Trust in local government, educational

attainment, and tax-exempt status explains support for the
tax millages.
In this chapter, I argue that security is not a simple
concept.

The primary argument of this dissertation is that

security is a multi-level construct, and not a single
variable.

This multi-level construct has led numerous

researchers to describe only a part of the problem of
security.

First, I will review the findings of this study

which confirm that different variables influence various
types of action which are taken to provide security.
psychological, stratification,

The

social network, and rational

choice approaches all fall short of presenting a unified
explanation of all levels of security and the free rider
problem.

I present a modified interpretation of rational

118
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choice theory that incorporates the concept of trust as a
necessary condition for understanding security and the free
rider problem.

I conclude this chapter with a summary of

this dissertation, acknowledging this study's limitations
and describing ways these ideas may be incorporated in the
design of public policy.
People react to crime in individualized ways and the
relationship between micro, meso, and macro level security
behaviors cannot be described exclusively substitutional or
complementary.

A substitutional effect is found in the

inverse relationship between security related measures in
and around the house and support for municipal policing tax
referenda.

However, a complementary effect was observed

between micro and meso levels: residents who take more
household security measures are more likely to pay dues to
the neighborhood association.

This complementary

relationship between support for security measures in the
home and community is not surprising.

Security at home and

in the neighborhood is a more immediate concern than other
areas of the city (Warr and Stafford, 1983).

The

complementary relationship between household and
neighborhood is one of propinquity, whereas the
substitutional relationship between household and municipal
government is one of distance.
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None of the theoretical approaches succeeds in
explaining all levels of security related behavior.
Responses to crime can only be understood as a combination
of individuals' crime- related concerns, the social and
cultural context of the neighborhood, and the social and
cultural context of the metropolitan area as a whole.
Review of Results

Psychological Approach
The psychological approach explains only one aspect of
Che problem of security.

Fear is strongly related to

individual avoidance measures but fails to explain
individual protective measures, contributions to the
neighborhood association, and electoral support for the
first two policing-related tax referenda.

Fear of crime is

associated significantly with voting behavior in the
successful tax referenda election.
Stratification Approach
Characteristics related to "traditional home and
neighborhood life," such as marital status and the presence
of children in the home are not related to adoption of any
security p r a c t i c e s . T a x liability predicts opposition to
Length of residence in the neighborhood was also not
related to participation at any level. This finding casts
doubt on the generalization that longer term residents of
the neighborhood are more likely to build and support
neighborhood institutions and promote stability (Kasarda
and Janowitz, 1974). Stability of a neighborhood may just
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the tax referenda.

Though education is not significantly

related to membership in the community association, there
is cause for further study of its relationship with
security.

Perhaps those with higher education were more

likely to oppose the tax referenda, but this may be because
they were more likely to own property that was not covered
by the homestead exemption.

Socioeconomic status may be a

factor in the adoption of security measures.

Those

residents with city property tax liability were more likely
to oppose all three tax referenda.

The survey did not

capture significant income variability among Midtown
neighborhood residents.^*
Though citizens with conservative political ideologies
are believed to have stronger anti-tax sentiments, crime

be an artifact of socioeconomic status. While length of
residence positively affects a person's involvement in the
social life of the neighborhood (Lewis and Salem, 1986;
Sampson, 1988), I found that length of residence in the
neighborhood was positively related to paying MNA dues (r =
.29, p= .02) in a zero order relationship. This finding
does not persist when controlling for other variables in
the multiple regression analysis. Adding length of
residence to the multiple regression models significantly
improved the fit for the number of avoidance measures
taken, but did not meaningfully contribute to models
analyzing the number of protective measures and all of the
tax referenda. Though adding length of residence in the
neighborhood may have improved the fit of the model
analyzing contributions to the MNA, this model does not
approach significance (prob. F = .37).
Approximately 90% of the sample had household incomes
above average.for East Baton Rouge Parish.
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and security-related issues are also salient issues for
conservatives.

The multivariate analyses in chapter three

showed no relationship

(controlling for other variables)

between political ideology and vote in the tax referenda.’’
Though race has traditionally been called one of the
most influential factors in Southern politics

(Key, 1949;

Black and Black, 1989; Carmines and Stimson, 1989), there
is no relationship between a measure of racial beliefs and
support for the policing tax referenda.
Social N e t w o r k A p p r o a c h

The social network perspective claims that relations
between residents influence behavior.

DuBow et al.

(197 9)

claimed that the relationship between social integration
and collective response is the single most important factor
in the study of security.

However, social integration

’’ One complaint about the nature of policing in East Baton
Rouge Parish was voiced several times. The city police and
parish sheriff's deputies are often publicly criticized for
wasting money through duplicating services.
Several survey
respondents recommended that the police services be
consolidated. However, while this argument is supported by
many, an argument can be made for not consolidating the
police and sheriff's office. Larger departments are not
more cost efficient. Several researchers have argued that
service delivery is less efficient and per capita costs of
police services are significantly higher in urban areas
than suburban areas (Ostrom and Parks, 1973; Bish and
Ostrom, 1979; Ostrom et al. 1973).
Though race related attitudes are difficult to measure,
substituting other race related attitudes in the multiple
regression model yielded similar (non-significant) results.
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affects only some types of security measures.

When

integration of the community is measured by the number of
friends in the community, there is no relationship with the
number of avoidance measures taken, but there is a
significant relationship with the number of protective
measures taken.

Residents listing more neighbors as

associates took fewer security measures.

Danger comes from

the unknown.
However, the findings do not support Podolefsky and
DuBow's (1981) idea that group membership is linked to
affective ties among neighbors.

Those residents listing

more associates residing in the neighborhood were not
significantly more likely to take any type of action other
than taking fewer protective measures.

Contributions to

the neighborhood organization cannot be explained as
prescribed behavior from other residents.

There appears to

be no significant relationship between embeddedness in
neighborhood life and voting behavior.
Rational Choice Approach
Because each dimension of security has a unique set of
determinants, I suggest that rational choice theory
provides the best explanation of security provision.

The

psychological approach fails to explain contributions to
collective action.

Tests of the stratification and social

network approaches also fail to demonstrate a relationship
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between constraints and collective action related to
security.

Rational choice theory argues that actors in the

system attempting to maximize their own profits from the
costs and benefits of each security related action.

This

argument requires two assumptions : 1) Utility differs at
micro, meso, and macro levels. 2) Trust in others is more
influential than personal contact.
Neither Hechter's nor Coleman's ideas are supported
because they do not account for utility differences among
micro - macro levels and they misinterpret the concept of
trust.

I argue that trust in government has two aspects:

1) Citizens must believe that their tax dollars are not
being squandered. 2) Citizens expect that others will
contribute.
Familiarity is not trust (Luhmann, 1988).
Participating in the MNA requires more than confidence that
the money will go to pay patrolling officers.
Contributions are given in the spirit of trust that others
will contribute.''®
The free rider problem is not solved by familiarity,
but by trust.

Trust is a "we" feeling that may be

developed through interpersonal exchange, but is also

One person's contribution would pay for less than one
hour of patrolling each month for the entire neighborhood.
The accumulation of contributions fund more effective
patrolling.
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produced by reputation (Putnam, 1993) .

Status

characteristics are cues to trustworthiness.

Newcomers to

the community may purchase their homes in a community based
on its reputation even though they do not know their
neighbors.’’

Trust in institutions may be garnered through

public relations campaigns.

Participation depends on

trust that the services will be delivered at a fair cost.
Collective behavior may be studied as a rational process.
DeTocqueville discussed "enlightened self-interest,"
or self-interest, properly understood.

Trust is the

linkage of enlightened self-interest with the value of the
good.

Empirical tests of rational choice approaches lack

an understanding of self-interest.

I believe that some of

the unexplained phenomenon of rational choice results from
the lack of understanding of actors' constraints.

The

character and circumstances of self-interest change in
trusting environments (Putnam, 1993).

Because of the

I observed that residents newer to the neighborhood
trust their neighbors and believe that crime comes from
outside the neighborhood, even though they have not
participated in a system of neighborly exchange.
They lack
repeated exchanges but still trust.
■*® Luhmann (1988) argues that trust is vital in personal
relations, but not functional systems like government.
I
disagree, trust is very important in government. Mistrust
and unequal taxation are themes of the popular political
commentator Rush Limbaugh and one source of the meteoric
rise of the right wing in mid-1990's American congressional
politics, just as Huey Long and Edwin Edwards' populism was
strongly supported by the electorate.
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systemic nature of rational choice theory, all hypotheses
were tested in multiple regression models which control for
other factors.

Fear of walking alone at night was the sole

significant variable related to the number of avoidance
measures taken.

In the model analyzing the number of

preventive measures taken, the number of associates in the
area listed by a resident, the fewer preventive measures
they are likely to take.

Needs are situational.

Residents

with knowledge about their neighbors are more likely to
spot suspicious occurrences and sense a greater number of
people looking after their homes.

I find no significant

variable related to paying dues in the Midtown Neighborhood
association.
Analysis of each of the three tax referenda yield
similar, but not identical, results.

Property tax

liability is significant in two out of the three elections.
Those residents owning property valued below the homestead
exemption were more likely to support the tax millages.
Education is significant.

Residents with higher

educational attainment were more likely to support the tax
referenda.

My first inclination was to check the

relationship between education and property tax liability.
These two variables are not related (r = -.003, p = .970).
Instead, just as educated respondents present racial
beliefs through more publicly accepted ways, I claim that
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the most educated citizens exert their political influence
through the electoral process.

An educated person's

protest takes place in the voting booth.
While trust in the local government was significant in
the first election only, note that fear of walking alone at
night is not significant in the first two elections but was
significant in the third election.

The third tax

referendum differed was unique from the previous two in
that the government mounted a large scale public relations
campaign, explaining to the public exactly where the money
would go.

It would fund small raises for employees of the

sheriff's office and allow for the operation of 144 more
beds in the parish prison.

This disclosure may have

generated trust among the electorate and was a key factor
in converting previously skeptical voters into supporters
for the tax increase.

This third election was also held in

1993, more than one year after the two tragic shootings of
the unarmed black men/*While Logan and Molotch (1987) propose that wealthier
neighborhoods "work within the system," what we may be
seeing is segregation leading to separate types of
security.

The MNA provides itself with police protection.

The third tax referenda used a public relations campaign
which focused on the slogan "lock 'em up." This slogan
presented a simple understanding of the problem that East
Baton Rouge Parish needed to enhance its jail space.
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There is no organized political effort to procure more
police for their own area (other than MNA protection), nor
is there a struggle with less affluent areas (finger
pointing, allegations that other neighborhoods get all the
police).

The MNA does not mobilize against the government.

There is little evidence that Midtown residents believe
they are

struggling with other areas for more police

patrolling because overall people are satisfied with the
police.

Few residents claim that other areas of the city

receive a disproportionate amount of patrolling.
Theoretical Implications
While trust is a property of a system, behavior may be
based on the value actors perceive in the exchange.

While

trustworthiness may encourage utilitarian actors to behave
in a certain manner, there is no incentive for actors to
invest more than the projected gain regardless of the
social capital in the relationship (Hardin, 1992).
Trust relationships and dependencies vary at each
level of security.

At the individual level, security is

gained by trust in others and faith that they will not be
harmed.

Taking an avoidance action is based on each

individual's judgement of the situation.

This dissertation

supports Skogan and Maxfield's (1981) finding that
Only 34% of the respondents believed that the police
paid less attention to Midtown than Baton Rouge as a whole
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avoidance follows fear as assessed by individual actors.
Protective behaviors are related to trust in the
environment around home.

Neighbor trust is related to

individual protective measures.

Knowing the area reduces

the field of the unknown which provides a greater feeling
of security (Warr 1990; Hunter and Baumer, 1982; Skogan and
Maxfield,

1981).

No variable is related to contribution to the Midtown
Neighborhood Association.

When asked about how the MNA

succeeds, the most common response was that "people must be
willing to pay their dues."

There is no formal mechanism

to create and maintain trust in the neighborhood.

Trust is

difficult to generate at this level and is considered a
primary factor in the difficulty of beginning and
maintaining successful community organizations.
In explaining the success of tax referenda for law
enforcement, trust in government is essential.

The

taxpayers want to believe that tax dollars will be used for
effective programs that are distributed and paid for in an
equitable manner.

Whether the government does enough or

not enough for security, whether it spends money wisely or
not, is a political debate that yields little fruit.

The

people speak as a collective through the electorate, as
neighbors, and in the actions they take.

United States
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citizens place a great deal of trust in politicians through
its representative democratic system.
Familiarity is a key issue in security.

Neighbors

familiar with the area may notice odd occurrences in the
area, and are more likely to report suspicious actions.
Residents strongly supported the idea of having the same
officers patrol the neighborhood throughout the year.^
One resident told of a story when a police officer thwarted
a burglary attempt at her home because he noticed a strange
car in the driveway.

However, I suggest that familiarity

does not create the "we" feeling which encourages
contributions to the MNA.
Limitations of the Study
First, I must address the nature of the area studied.
Urban life is unique from other areas in that it provides
several alternatives for its residents

(Fischer, 1982).

Rural communities may not organize to provide patrolling,
nor can they easily watch over their neighbors homes.
Also, though urban areas are made up of diverse populations
which cut across all social classes, the population studied
for this dissertation is a homogeneous, white, middle class
community in a southern metropolitan area.

The level of

Sixty-seven percent strongly agreed with the statement
"It would be better if the same police officers patrolled
this neighborhood." Ninety-three percent agreed at least
somewhat.
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homogeneity allows for study beyond individual attributes
of actors and facilitates analysis of a system, ceteris
paribus.
Definitions of fear of crime vary with each
conceptualization, potentially leading to different results
(LaGrange and Ferraro, 1989) .

Designing indices of

avoidance and protective measures was a process of constant
testing, retesting, adding variables, subtracting
variables, and compromises.

Using these indices may

obscure the understanding of individual security practices
such as gun ownership.
This dissertation offers no concrete solution to
understanding contributions to the Midtown Neighborhood
association.

It is difficult to measure the value of each

security measure for each individual.

Those residents in

the area not contributing to the MNA do not feel more or
less safe (X- = 0.877, p = .645), therefore, I cannot say
that the MNA provides a welfare good (Rich, 1980a).
Festinger et al.,

(1950) claimed that group membership

may offer rewards in just belonging, rather than
utilitarian benefits.

However, though deference goods are

more likely to operate in homogeneous communities

(Keller,

1968; Almy, 1975), people more integrated into neighborhood
life are not more likely to contribute to the MNA.

Even

though the MNA is the provider of supplemental security and
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on the whole people feel good about the neighborhood and
the MNA, there is competition for the security dollar
outside of the neighborhood level.
Trust is a difficult concept to measure.

Though

repeated exchange may produce a spirit of trust (Coleman,
1990a), this spirit of reciprocity is difficult to measure
(Putnam, 1993}.

The "we" feeling is a subjective

evaluation based on personal judgements.

Social networks

do offer support but also may act as burdens (Kilburn,
1996).

More empirical research should be done

understanding neighborhood cultural influence on residents'
actions in neighborhoods.

Because the ability to mobilize

and create a public good may depend on tie structure
(Granovetter, 1973: Crenson, 1978),

further research should

go beyond the existence of ties and explore the structure
of residents' social networks.
A common criticism of rational choice approaches,
especially those attempting to assess maximization of
utility, is that any preference may be hypothesized as the
cause of any social outcome.

The problem of studying

"self-interest properly understood" is that understanding
influential forces may be puzzling.

Participation in

voluntary organizations means different things to different
people and there are many types of organizations that
individuals may support (Wuthnow, 1991) .
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Implications for Professional Practice
Trust is the solution to the problem of order, and
people vary in their reaction to others and propensity to
trust others.

Through these modifications of rational

choice theory, we are best able to understand selfinterest.

While civic culture is developed through shared

cooperation and action (Almond and Verba, 1963), security
presents a dilemma in that there is no universally shared
understanding of the problem.

In security, taking

individual measures in and around the home leads to
decreased support for other types of measures in the city,
but not from neighborhood life.

Reich (1991) noted that

more affluent communities are collecting private funds to
provide supplemental services to their areas, calling this
phenomena the "secession of the s u c c e s s f u l . H o w e v e r ,
contributions to the MNA do not replace support for
municipal security related tax increases.

McKenzie (1994) notes that in 1992 America had over
150,000 homeowner associations providing various services
for over 32,000,000 people.
The development of community organizations challenges
the Tiebout hypothesis that people move around the
metropolis on a constant search for the "optimal"
combination of governmental services and taxes. The city
is abandoned when people cannot afford to move.
This
dissertation asserts that affluent members are willing to
support raising their own taxes if the government justifies
the increased expenditures.
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While civic engagement is often viewed as a
dichotomous choice between self-interest and altruism,

I

suggest that civic engagement is created through trust in
the good itself (technological trust), or trust in the
agent delivering the good.

Purposive action takes place

when there is trust that the actors' needs are fulfilled,
though needs and levels of trust among actors are variable.
Trust is a property of a system and not just a personal
attribute.

Why would anybody own a gun at home and risk

injury or accidents if they did not trust that it would
protect them?

Why would residents pay for alarm systems if

they did not trust it would protect them?

Gun owners trust

that gun handlers will be responsible, just as consumers of
alarm systems trust that the company they are dealing with
is reliable.
Understanding collective behavior requires
understanding actors' motives to cooperate (Williams,
1988).

Rational choice is criticized, but motives can be

generalized for network members possessing specific
characteristics.

Having these characteristics is not

sufficient to understand security, but people sharing like
characteristics are more likely to reside in similar
geographic locations and hold similar beliefs.
Putnam (1993) suggests that building trust through
repeated exchange leads to strong support for institutions.
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These institutions aid in creating a "we" feeling that
further legitimates and perpetuates the existence of the
institution.

Isolates lack trust and do not visualize the

payoff of contribution to collective goods.
Gaining the citizens' trust may sound simple, but it
is difficult to do.

People with lower status are more

likely to view the government as illegitimate.

Through

public relations campaigns, the institution requesting
support already has that "foot in the door" which leads to
greater success for exchange and cooperation (Good, 1988).
Residents of Baton Rouge differ in their capacity for
trusting the government.

When Patrick Esco and Chauncey

Thomas were shot to death by local law enforcement
personnel, these incidents reduced levels of trust by the
citizenry.

Poor areas lacking social and political capital

rely on themselves to supply security, protecting
themselves with weapons as portable security systems.
A few years ago, some cars displayed bumper stickers
with the slogan "pay police like your life depends on it."
This slogan attempts to exploit fear to gain support for
police and does little to build trust between the citizens
and the police department.

I argue that this campaign did

little to develop citizens' trust in their police that is
essential to support for additional resources.
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Peterson (1981) divided all public goods as being
administered through developmental and redistributive
policies.

Developmental policies are based on competition

with other communities and are focused on improving the
entire area.

These developmental policies help attract

business to the area and improve the area's national
standing in quality of life assessments.

Redistributive

policies redistribute resources from the wealthier to those
of lesser means.

Voters are likely to support an election

if they view the issue as developmental, benefitting
everyone, and not redistributive, in which the affluent pay
most of the taxes and the less-affluent receive most of the
benefit

(Weaver and Parent, 1994; Button, 1992; Hahn and

Kamieneki, 1987).

I expected to find that residents

perceiving the greatest amount of inequitable governmental
service delivery will be most likely to oppose tax
millages.

Homogeneous white areas may possibly view

municipal security as an issue in which some residents are
paying high taxes for extra policing in high crime (or
black) neighborhoods.

The third tax referenda's appeal to

lock up criminals and provide more jail space appeared to
reach the white middle class voters of the Midtown area.
There was a greater perceived benefit in creating more jail
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space than raising officers' pay, even though the third
referendum did provide money for employee raises.
The root of tax and governmental service equity is
Louisiana's tax system.

Sales taxes are paid by all and

property taxes are paid primarily by business and partially
by those owning property valued in excess of $75,000.
Opponents of high sales taxes claim that they are
regressive, with the poor paying a disproportionate share
of their income.

Opponents of higher property taxes claim

that business and the affluent bear too much of the
taxation b u r d e n . F o r property tax millages, an appeal
must be made to more affluent residents of the city.

Those

responsible for property taxes must develop trust in the
government by being convinced that they will receive
benefits which outweigh the costs.

Though residents in

Midtown have joined together to pay dues, the MNA is no
substitute for the criminal justice system.

Neighborhood

organizations do not threaten support for governmental
programs.
For the less affluent, trust must be made through the
value of the governmental service.

The wealthier must be

-■* Gov. Earl Long popularized his description of the
Louisiana electorate with the slogan "Don't tax you. Don't
tax me. Tax that guy behind the tree."
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sold on the idea that they will pay for and receive a fair
share of the services.
A shortcoming of my argument is that trust is not
concrete.

Trust can only be operationalized in a

situational context.

Assessments of preferences and

constraints are highly subjective (Hechter et al., 1990).
However, I assert that social scientists must look in the
direction of the value of goods and trust in the related
system.
In neighborhoods, even a small percentage of committed
residents can make an impact on neighborhood life.
politics,

50% plus one vote is a victory.

explain the actions of every actor,

In

While I do not

I provide a direction

which may reach many of the people.
This dissertation presents a methodological challenge.
Assigning values to goods and measuring trust will not be
an easy task, but I assert that this is the foundation to
understanding the problem of security, and hence, one
aspect of the problem of order.
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APPENDIX A

Table A.l
Screened Eligible Responses
Listed in 1991
Directory
No

Yes

Total

41

96

137

70.70%

72.20%

71.70%

17

37

54

29.30%

37.80%

28.30%

58

133

191

Complete

Refusal

Table A.2
All Inhabited Houses
Listed in 1991
Directory
No

Yes

Total

41

96

137

50.00%

51.90%

51.30%

17

37

54

20.70%

20.00%

2 0 .20%

Did Not

24

52

76

Contact

29.30%

28.10%

28.50%

82

185

267

Complete

Refusal
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SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

One hundred thirty-seven surveys were completed for
this study.

A total of 282 confirmed addresses in the area

were sent letters of introduction and approached to be
surveyed.

In the process,

to be vacant.

15 houses (5.3%) were confirmed

Of the 267 inhabited households,

137 (51.3%)

completed the survey, 46 (17.2%) directly refused our
interviewer, 8 (3.0%) broke two or more appointments to be
interviewed, 21 (7.9%) homes were believed to have someone
inside but did not open their door, and 55 (20.6%) were not
contacted in at least four attempts.
Of the entire survey sample, 90 homes were not listed
as eligible for membership in the Midtown Neighborhood
Association.

Eight (8.9%) of these were vacant.

Of the 82

inhabited households not eligible for membership in the
Midtown Neighborhood Association, 41 (50%) completed the
survey, 14 (17.1%) directly refused our interviewer, 3
(3.7%) broke two or more appointments to be interviewed, 8
(9.8%) homes were believed to have someone inside but did

In order to increase response rates and ensure
interviewer safety, interviewers did not attempt to
interview at night.
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not open their door, and 16 (19.5%) were not contacted in
at least four attempts.
One hundred and ninety-two homes in the sample were
eligible for membership in the Midtown Neighborhood
Association.

Seven (3.6%) of these homes were vacant.

Of

the 185 inhabited households eligible for membership in the
Midtown Neighborhood Association, 96 (51.9%) completed the
survey, 32 (17.3%) directly refused our interviewer, 5
(2.7%) broke two or more appointments to be interviewed, 13
(7.0%) were believed to have someone inside but did not
open the door, and 39 (21.1%) were not contacted in at
least four attempts.

Table A.3
1990 U.S. Census characteristics of
contains Midtown neighborhood

block group which

Population - 740
white population - 732
black population - 0
other population - 8
number of households - 331
median year housing structure was built - 1952
white female headed households
with children -1.8%
white female headed households
with nochildren - 4.2%
median household income (for 1989) - $ 36,544
per capita income (for 1989) - $ 18,014
white per capita income - $ 18,014
black per capita income - 0
public assistance per household - 0
whites over age 25 with HS diploma (includes GED) - 518
white individuals living in poverty - 6
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APPENDIX B
Table A.4
Hiâtory of SaCon Rouae Tax Elections
Pass-Failed
April 1987
May 1987
May 1987
May 1987
May 1987
Nov 1987
April 1988
May 1990
Jan 1992
April 1992
April 1992
April 1992
April 1992
July 1992
Oct. 1993

17 mills
2 mills
5 mills
6 mills
.5 mills
Indefinite
1/2 cent sales
1/2 cent
7 mills
10 mills
8 mills
2 mills
.25 mills
14 mills
7.5 mills

Sewerage improvements
Park operations
School operations
School employee raise
Anti-drug program
Sewerage improvement
Sewerage improvement
Street repairs
Sheriff's office operation
School operations
School employee raises
School books
I Care (anti-drug)
police/fire operation
police/prison
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APPENDIX C
Table A . 5
S
->

L
.A
, ^

W
<

A

if City Polies Dispatches for 1990 and 1993
Baton Rouge

District 2A

1990

1993

1990

1993

Burglary

9,798

9,242

876

946

Shootings or shots
fired

1,778

3,242

152

293

Stabbings

357

281

36

30

Armed Robberies

533

1,094

50

80

Table A . 6
Police Dispatches bv Subdistrict, Mav 1992 - Mav 1993
(Midtown is centrally located in this area making up about
half of the geography.)
Zone 2A-3
Burglary

257

Armed Robbery

46

Assault

74

Stabbing
Shootings or
Shots fired

2

79
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Zero-Order Correlation Table of Protective Measures
X,

8
ci'

3
3"
CD

Installed Alarm

X,

1.000

X,

Install Dead Bolts

X,

.249"

1.000

X,

Purchase a Dog for
Protection

X,

-.040

.010

1.000

Installed Security
Fences

X,

-.029

.138

.219'

1.000

X.,

Leave TV, Radio,
Lights On

Xj

- .034

075

-.028

-.120

1.000

Purchased Weapons
for Protection

X&

.035

.251"

.251"

.055

.117

1.000

Installed Window
Locks

X,

.051

.402"

.012

.099

-.113

.112

1.000

X.

Installed Outdoor
Lighting

X„

.203'

.569"

.167

.173'

-.073

.151

.278"

1.000

X,

X,

CD

■D
O
Q.
C

a
O
3
"O
O
CD
Q.

X,

T3

CD
(/)
(/)
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APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW MAIN OWNER/RENTER OR SPOUSE. USING PENCIL, CIRCLE NUMBER OR
ENTER CORRECT ANSWER.
CIRCLE "MISSING" IF DON'T KNOW, NO RESPONSE,
CAN'T SAY.

Midtown

1 (1)

ID

(3-6)

Interviewer N a m e : ________________________________________

(8-9)

STREET ADDRESS ______________________

(11-16)

ADDRESSEE ___________________________

(18-21)

First Try
Second
Third
Fourth______

Dates/Time
__________
_________
__________
_________

Date of Interview:
_______________ 19____
(date)
(month) (year)

of attempted contact?
___________
___________
___________
___________

(23-24)
(26-27)
(29-30)

Reason for non-interview:
1. no one home in 4 calls
2. someone seems to be at home, but no one answers the door
3. direct refusal.
4. Indirect refusal. Always too busy, two or more broken appointments
5. Respondent does not speak English
6. Dwelling was vacant— no one living there.
(32)
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Introduction
Hello— I'm a student at LSU in the Department of Sociology.
We 're doing a neighborhood study of the Midtown area. Are you the
man/woman of the house? ((If yes, continue ; If n o , ask to speak to
him/her))
Did you get our letter about this? ((IF TES..continue; IF
NO..give copy of letter first}).
As the letter says w e 're interested in the quality of people's
lives and the quality of life in their communities. You can call the
Department at LSU (388-1645) to confirm ray identity, or youcan ask
the other students who are interviewing other people up and down the
street right now.
I '11 be asking you about life in this neighborhood and the kinds of
things you do to protect yourself and your family.
This is a
volunteer study being conducted by students.
It's not an ordinary
survey.
It's more interesting because it's not just etbout you but
about the people you know, and about topics such as crime. As that
letter explained, I would like to ask some questions of a member of
your household.
The interview should take about 20 minutes.
First, in order to figure out who is eligible for this interview, I
need to get an idea of who lives here.
1. The name we had from the phone book was
correct?
l.Yes

[ADDRESSEE).

Is that

2.No

(34)

2. So you are ?
(WRITE NAME)
(ask IF NECESSARY)
3.

How many adults live here? ______

(36)

4.

How many children live here? _______

(38)

5.

How many of these children are

(40)

under 12? _____

Who to interview?
IF BOTH MAN & WOMAN ARE PRESENT, TALK TO THE PERSON WHO SPENDS THE
MOST TIME AT HOME.
IF ONE IS RELUCTANT, INTERVIEW THE OTHER.
IF THE
PERSON YOU'RE TALKING TO IS NOT THE MAIN MAN/WOMAN OF THE HOUSE, DO
NOT COMPLETE THE INTERVIEW. THANK HIM/HER A ND ASK FOR A GOOD TIME TO
RETURN.
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6. In what year did you first begin living in this home? 19
(4 2 - 4 3 )

7. Did you grow up in
Louisiana?
Baton Rouge?
this neighborhood?
this house/apt?

(Circle all that apply)
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N

___ (45)
___ (47)
___ (49)
___ (51)

8. How long have you lived in (enter years)
_______ Louisiana
_______ Baton Rouge
_______ this neighborhood
_______ this house/apt

(53-54)
(56-57)
(59-60)
(62-63)

THE NEIGHBORHOOD
"These first questions are about the neighborhood."
9. Some people feel that their neighborhood is a real home to them,
while others think of it as just a place where they happen to be
living.
Which one of those comes closest to the way you consider this
neighborhood, a real home or ]ust a place to live.
1. real home 2. ]ust a place to live
(9.missing)
(65)
10. How likely is it that you might move out of this neighborhood
within the next couple of years?
1.definitely
2.probably
3.probably won't
4.definitely won't
(9.missing)
___ (67)
11. Supposing that for some reason you had to move away from the
Midtown area, how sorry would you be to leave?
1. Very sorry 2. Somewhat sorry 3. Not too sorry
4. Not at all sorry
(9. missing)
(69)
12. How often do the following things happen around here?
HAND RESPONDENT CARD "A" with responses: 1.often
3. rarely
4. never.
(Circle 9 if missing.)

2. sometimes

a)

You hear loud noises from the street when you're inside ___(71)
1
2
3
4
9
b) People walk down this street that aren't from around here
(73)
1
2
3
4
9
c) Neighbors play music too loud, have late parties, or quarrels
(75)
1
2
3
4
9
d) People leave litter or trash around the area
(77)
1
2
3
4
9
e) People don't take care of their property or lawn
(79)
1
2
3
4
9
f) Purse snatching, robbery, or other street crimes_________ ___ (1)
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((RESPONSES ARE:
g)

1. Often

2. Sometimes

3. Rarely
(9.missing))

4.Never

Gunshots

12)
1
2
3
4
9
hi You see drug dealers or users on thestreet
___ (5)
1
2
3
4
9
1 ) You see homeless people
___ (7)
1
2
3
4
9
___ (9)
iI Families let their children getout of control
1
2
3
4
9
k) People are loud or disorderly
(11)
1
2
3
4
9
I) You personally have hassles or conflicts with people living in the
area
1
2
3
4
9
(13)
13. Do you have any worries about safety when you see young kids— I
mean kids under 12— playing outside around here?
1. Yes
2. No
(9.missing) ___ (15)
14. Thinking of the Midtown area as a whole, how many of the people
who live around here can be trusted?
1. almost all
2. most can
3. about half
(17)
4. most can't
5. almost no one
(9.missing)
15. How many neighbors do you know by name?
anyone up and down the block.
l.all
2.nearly all
3.most
5.some
6.not many
7.none

By neighbors I mean
4.about

half

(9.missing)
16. How many neighbors do you know by sight?
l.all
2.nearly all
3.most
5.some
6.not many
7.none

___ (19)

4.about half
(9.missing) ____ (21)

17. Thinking about your adult friends that you have now, how many of
them would you say live in this neighborhood?
1. nearly all
2. most
3. a few
4. none
(9. missing)
(23)
18. How often do you do the following things in this neighborhood?
HAND CARD "A" TO RESPONDENT with responses: 1. often
3. rarely 4. never
(9. missing)

a)

you borrow something small from neighbors
1

b)
c)
d)

2. sometimes

2

3

4

(25)

9

your neighbors borrow something small from you
1
2
3
4
9
you greet or talk to people you don't know very well
1
2
3
4
9
you visit with neighbors informally at home
1
2
3
4
9
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((RESPONSES ARE:

1. Often

2. Sometimes

3. Rarely

4.Never

(9.missing))
e) you have picnics,
1
2

parties, or bar-b-que's with neighbors ___ (33)
3
4
9

19. Taking all your adult relatives and in-laws, except the very
distant ones, how many of them live in this neighborhood?
1.nearly all
2.most
3.a few
4.none
(9. missing)
(35)
20. Thinking about the people that live around here, do you sometimes
wish there were more people in the neighborhood you could talk or get
together with; or do you feel OK about the way things are?
____ (37)
1. more people
2.O.K.
(9.missing)
21. What about having people you can rely on to look after your house
and your things when you're out or away.
Do you sometimes wish you
knew more people like that; or do you feel OK about the way things
are?
1. more people
2.O.K.
(9.missing)
____ (39)
22. Overall, during the past two years, would you say that your
neighborhood has become a better place to live, has gotten worse, or
I S about the same as it used to be?
1.better
2.same
3.worse
(9.missing)
(41)
23. All things considered, what do you think the neighborhood will be
like two years from now? Will it be a better place to live, will it
have gotten worse, or will it be about the same as it is now?
1.better
2.same
3.worse
(9.missing)
(43)
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PERSONAL RELATIONS
In this next section, I'd like to ask you just five questions about
some of the specific people you know, at least close enough to call by
name. I need the full name. We 're not concerned with who the people
are, but we have to keep track and often people have the same or
similar names. We put this information into the computer by numbers
and we destroy the names themselves to insure your confidentiality.
No one will ever see the names themselves.

Interviewer Instructions: Get the full name as far as R knows it.
If R OBJECTS OR HESITATES: These are just standard survey items; we
destroy the actual names and use numbers so no one can be identified.
I'm just asking for names in order to keep things straight.
All this
information is just converted into numbers and we don't keep the names
once we do that. We're trying to find, out whether people know people
in the neighborhood or outside it.
TRY TWICE FOR FULL NAMES: IF R
continues to refuse, ask for first names only.

Important: WRITE DOWN THE NAMES ON THE LEFT ON THE MATRIX and MAKE A
CHECK IN THE COLUMN FOR ALL QUESTIONS WHERE THE NAME IS GIVEN. But if
R has already given you the name, check the column for that question
and d o n 't write it down again.

NAME QUESTIONS

(1) From time to time, people discuss important matters with other
people. Looking back over the last six months - who are the people
with whom you discussed matters important to you?
(Write down each name and make a check mark in column 1.
If less than
5 names mentioned, probe anyone else? Only record first five names.)

IA) Are any of these people relatives?
(make check mark in column la)

IB) Do any of these people live in the Midtown area?
(check column lb)

(2) Just counting the adults, who are the people that normally live in
this household? Just give me their first £ last names.
By adult I mean 16 and over.
((make check mark in column 2))
(3) Not including the people who live here, what adult relatives do
you or your husband/wife have in the Midtown area.
Just give me their first & last names.
((make check mark in column 3))
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(4) Are there any people in the Midtown area that you would consider
friends or close personal acquaintances? What are their names?
((make check mark in column 4))
((IF P asks about "friends", say use your own definition))

(5) How about in the Baton Rouge area (but outside the Midtown area) .
Are there any you would consider friends or close personal
acquaintances? What are their names?
((make check mark in column 5)}

In answer to these last questions, you gave me the names of some of
the people you know. Now I'd like to get a little more information
about them.
Interviewer: WRITE JUST THE FIRST NAMES IN BLOCK LETTERS ON SEPARATE
SHEET HAND the list of first names TO R .
Make CHECK MARKS ON THE MATRIX WHILE R. LOOKS AT THE LIST OF FIRST
NAMES.

a & b) Please tell me the Sex and Race of the people on the list.
((IF ASKED WHY WE WANT TO KNOW, explain that we want to find out
whether people know others with a different sex or background than
themselves.))

c) Which of the people on this list do you feel especially close to?
Just give me the first names of the people.

d) Not counting the people who live here, is there anyone on the list
you have dropped in on for a chat during the past few months, or
anyone who has dropped by on you for a casual visit? Just give me the
first names.

e) Not counting the people who live here, is there anyone on the list
you have invited over to your home during the past few months, or
anyone who has invited you over to their home? Again, just the first
names.

f) Not counting the people who live here, which people on this list do
you ask to take care of your home when you're gone? For example, to
watch the house, water plants, pick up the mail, or feed a pet, that
type of thing.

g) How about anyone who asks you to take care of theirs?

h) How long have you known (NAME OF PERSON) in years?
ASK FOR EACH NAME: If "all my life",

code 95.
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SECURITY
Now I'd like to ask some questions about safety,
affairs.

security, and local

24. Would you say you follow what's going on in local government and
public affairs?
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. only now and then
4. hardly at all
(9. missing)
(45)
25. Have you ever written or spoken to your metro council
representative or some other local leader?
1. Yes
2. No
(9. missing)

(47)

26. Have you ever written a letter to the editor of the local
newspaper?
1. Yes
2.
No
(9. missing)

(49)

27. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican,
Democrat, Independent or what?
(51)
1. Republican
2.Democrat
3. Independent
4. other
(9. missing)
28. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.
If extremely liberal is point 1 and extremely conservative is point 7,
where would you place yourself?
(53)
29. How much of the time would you say you trust the local government?
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. almost never
(9.missing)
___ (55)
30. Are you registered
tovote?
(IF NO, skip to question #37)

l.Yes

2.No

(9.missing)

_____(57)

31. Did you vote in the tax election for the sheriffs department this
past October 16th?
1. yes
2. no
3. don't remember
(9.missing) ___ (59)
32. IF YES: How did you vote?
1. in favor
2. against
3. did not vote
4. don't remember (9.missing)

(61)

If you remember, last year both the sheriff's department (Jan. 1992)
and the city police department (July 1992) had elections that would
have raised property taxes in order to provide more funding.
33. Did you vote in the sheriff's tax election in January of 1992?
1. Yes
2. No
(9.missing) ____ (63)
34. IF YES: How did you vote?
1. for
2. against

3. don't

remember (9.missing) ___ (65)

35. Did you vote in the police department's tax election in July,
1992?
1. Yes
2. No
(9.missing) ____ (67)
36. IF YES: How did you vote?
1. for
2. against

3. don't

remember (9.missing) ___ (69)
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37. Whether or not you registered or voted, do you support increased
revenues to local law enforcement agencies?
1. Support strongly
2. Support somewhat
3. oppose somewhat
4. oppose strongly (9.missing)
____ (71)
38. In this area, is there any kind of local group, such as a
homeowners' association, a block club, or any other sort of
neighborhood organization?
l.Yes
2.No
3.don't know (9.missing)
___ (73)
39. What groups? (record names as respondent knows them, use back of
sheet if necessary— PROBE: Anything else?) ____________________________

40. Have you ever been a member of the Midtown Association?
(IT NO, SKIP TO QUESTION §43}
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing) ___(75)
41. If YES, have you ever contributed money to this program?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing)
___ (77)
42.

If YES,

do you currentlv contribute money to this program?
l.Yes
2.No (9.missing)
____ (79)

43. On a scale of 1 to 10with 1 being totally ineffective and 10
being extremely effective, how effective is this program?
_____
(1 )

98.

Haven't heard of the program

99. missing

44. Does this neighborhood have a neighborhood watch program?
(IF NO, SKIP TO QUESTION §45} l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing)
____(3)
b. IF YES, do you participate in it? l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing) ____ (5)
45. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being totally ineffective and 10
being extremely effective, how effective is this program?
_____
(7)
98.

Haven't heard of the program

99. missing

46. Many people have taken steps to protect themselves and their
property from crime and criminals.
Have you taken (or requested) any
These apply to you
of the following steps? (circle all that apply)
and your family, not to things already on the home when you came
here.
9 ___ (9)
Y
N
a) INSTALLED AN ALARM SYSTEM
9 ___ (11)
N
b) INSTALLED DEAD BOLTS
Y
9 ___ (13)
N
Y
c) INSTALLED DOOR CHAINS
9 ___ (15)
Y
N
d) INSTALLED SECURITY FENCES
9 ___ (17)
N
e) INSTALLED WINDOW LOCKS OR GRATES
Y
9 ___ (19)
Y
N
f) PITRCHASED WEAPONS
9 ___ (21)
Y
N
g) PURCHASED A DOG FOR PROTECTION
9 ___ (23)
Y
N
h) AVOIDED GOING OUT ALONE
9 ___ (25)
Y
N
i) AVOIDED GOING OUT AT NIGHT
9 ___ (27)
N
Y
j) AVOIDED CERTAIN PLACES IN THE CITY
9 ___ (29)
N
k) JOINED A COMMUNITY CRIME WATCH PROGRAM
Y
(31)
N
9
Y
1) CARRIED A WEAPON OUTSIDE THE HOME
9 ___ (33)
N
m) REFUSED TO ANSWER THE DOOR
Y
(35)
9
n) INSTALLED OUTDOOR LIGHTING
Y
N
9 ___ (37)
o) LEAVE LIGHTS/RADIO/TV ON WHEN YOU'RE GONE Y N
9 ___ (39)
)
Y
N
P) OTHER (Diease soecifv
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47. Do you now personally own a gun of any kind?

l.Yes

2.No

(41)
(9.missing)
protection, both, or

48. IP YES, did you acquire the gun for hunting,
something else?
1. Hunting
2. Protection
3. both
4. other
(9.missing)

(43)

49. Have you ever been threatened with a gun, or shot at?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing) ___ (45)
50. In general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale of
handguns should be made more strict, less strict, or kept the same as
they are now.
l.more strict
2.the same 3.less strict
(9.missing)
___ (47)
CRIME
HAND RESPONDENT CARD "B" WITH RESPONSES
3. not very safe
4. not safe at all

1. very safe
2. fairly safe
(9. missing)

51. As far as crime is concerned, how safe do you feel personally?
l.very safe 2.fairly safe
3.not very safe
4.not safe at all
(9.mussing)
(49)
52. Again, as far as crime is concerned, how safe do you feel this
household is?
1. very safe
2. fairly safe
3. not very safe
4. not safe at all
(9.missing)
(51)
53. Now about this neighborhood.
How safe do you feel it is?
l.very safe
2. fairly safe 3. not very safe 4. not safe at all
(9.missing)
(53)
54. How about the safety of Baton Rouge in general?
1. very safe 2. fairly safe 3. not very safe 4. not safe at all
(9.missing)
(55)
55. Is there any area right around here— that is, within a mile— where
you would be afraid to walk alone at night?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing)
(57)
56. Thinking about the neighborhoods in Baton Rouge, are there any you
go out of your way to avoid driving through?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing)
(59)
57. There's been a lot of talk about the murder rate in Baton Rouge
this year?
I'm going read a few things that might be responsible and
ask your opinion:
HAND RESPONDENT CARD "C" WITH RESPONSES:
1. agree strongly
2. agree somewhat
3. disagree somewhat
4. disagree strongly
Homicide rates are high because:
a) There's a lot of poverty and misery in some areas of Baton Rouge.
1
2
3
4
9
(61)
b) Drug dealers arekilling
each other.
(63)
1
2
3
4
9
c) Innocent bystanders arebeing
shot in
drug wars.
(65)
1
2
3
4
9
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Violence within the home is increasing.
(67)
1
2
3
4
9
e) Guns are so easy to get hold of.
(69)
1
2
3
4
9
f) Most victims of murder in Baton Rouge are involved in drugs or
crime.
1
2
3
4
9
(71)
g) Gambling will cause crime to increase.
(73)
1
2
3
4
9
h) If someone assaulted me, I could protect myself.
(75)
1
2
3
4
9
1 ) Even in my home. I'm not safe from people who want to take what I
have.
1
2
3
4
9
(77)
j) I would be afraid if someone knocked on my door after dark and I
wasn't expecting anyone.
1
2
3
4
9
(1)
k) The courts in this area deal too harshly with criminals. ____ (3)
1
2
3
4
9
1) The courts in this area are harder on blacks than they are on
w hites.
1
2
3
4
9
(5)
m) Crime is the most important issue facing us right now.
____ (7)
1
2
3
4
9
n) There is too much coverage of crime in the media right now. ___ (9)
1
2
3
4
9
o) I'm more afraid of violence than I am of getting things stolen.
(11)
1
2
3
4
9
p) Gun ownership by ordinary people helps to prevent crime. ___ (13)
1
2
3
4
9
c) If guns are outlawed, only criminals will have guns.
(15)
1
2
3
4
9
r! Accidental deaths by guns are quite frequent.
(17)
1
2
3
4
9
_

d)

58. There is a certain amount of crime in any neighborhood.
What's
your feeling about who's responsible for the crime around here?
Is it
most likely:
1. people who live here (that is, in this neighborhood)
2. people from other neighborhoods in Baton Rouge
3. people who aren't from Baton Rouge
(9. missing)
(19)
59. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of
murder?
1.favor death penalty
2.oppose death penalty
(9.missing) ___ (21)
60. Has a crime been committed against any of your property during the
past two years?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing)
___ (23)
61. Have you been the victim of a violent crime
person) during the past two years? l.Yes
2.No

(that is, against your
(9.missing)
___ (25)

62. IF YES, did you report this crime to the police?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing)
63. Not including you, has anyone in
crime in the past two years?
l.Yes

_____ (27)

this household been a victim of
2.No (9.missing)
____ (29)
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64. How many other people do you know in this neighborhood that have
been crime victims in the past two years?
1. many
2. a few
3. none (9.missing) ___ (31)
65. Have you heard of Operation Takedown?
l.Yes
2.No

(9.missing) ___ (33)

66. How often do you see the police in this neighborhood (not
including private security patrols)?
1. often
2. some
3. almost never
(9.missing) ___ (35)
67. Do you think the police pay more or less attention to this
neighborhood than Baton Rouge as a whole?
1. more
2. same
3. less
(9.missing) ___ (37)
HAND RESPONDENT CARD "C" WITH RESPONSES: 1. agree strongly
2. agree somewhat
3. disagree somewhat 4. disagree strongly
"These
68. a)
reduce
b) The

next questions are about the police and sheriff's office."
More money needs to be spent on law enforcement in order to
the incidence of crime.
1
2
3
4
9
(39)
police and deputies generally do a good job in Baton Rouge.
(41)
1
2
3
4
9
c) The police and deputies generally do a good job in this
neighborhood.
1
2
3
4
9
(43)
d) It would be better if the same police officers patrolled this
neighborhood all the time and people knew
who they were.
____(45)
1
2
3
4
9
e) It would be better if the police were less involved in this
neighborhood.
(47)
1
2
3
4
9
f) It would be better if the police were more involved in this
neighborhood, even if it took them a little longer to respond to 911
calls.
(49)
1
2
3
4
9
g) The police

are generally a nuisance around
here.
1
2
3
4
h) The police act too aggressively toward the members
community.
1
2
3
4
i) The police need to do more to get the drug dealers
1
2
3
4
9
j) The police are too hard on blacks.
1
2
3
4

(51)
9
of this
9
(53)
off the streets.
(55)
(57)
9

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

169

ATTITUDES
69. In most places there are differences or conflicts between people.
In your opinion, how much conflict or tension is there between (XX) in
BR?
a. poor people and rich people
(59)
l.lots
2.some
3.very little
(9.missing)
b. How
about blacks and whites?
(61)
l.lots
2.some
3.very little
(9.missing)
c. How
about whites & Asians?
(63)
l.lots
2.some
3.very little
(9.missing)
d. How
about blacks & Asians?
(65)
l.lots
2.some
3.very little
(9.missing)
70. Would you be willing to pay a tax to provide the following
services for Baton Rouoe?
1. Yes
2. No
(9.missing/don't know)
a)
b)
c)
d)

litter pick up andlandscaping
police patrols
neighborhood schools
extended day care

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
N

9
9
9
9

(67)
(69)
(71)
(73)

71. Would you be willing to pay a tax to provide the following
services if the service was provided for the Midtown neighborhood area
alone?
I. Yes
2. No
(9.missing/don't know)
a)
b)
c)
d)

litter pick up and landscaping
police patrols
neighborhood schools
extended day care

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
N

9
9
9
9

___ (75)
___ (77)
___ (79)
___ (1)

RACE
"Now I'd like to ask you some questions about relations between blacks
and whites."
For each of the following tell me whether you 1. agree strongly
2. agree somewhat 3. disagree somewhat or 4. disagree strongly. (HAND
RESPONDENT CARD "C")
72. a) The position of blacks has been improving in the past few
years.
1
2
3
4
9_______________ (3)
b) Most people would prefer to live in neighborhoods with people of
their same race.
1
2
3
4
9
___ (5)
c) The government should not make any special effort to help
minorities.
1
2
3
4
9_______________ (7)
d) Most whites are afraid of blacks.
___ (9)
1
2
3
4
9
e) Most blacks are afraid of whites.
___ (11)
1
2
3
4
9
f) Blacks have too little influence in the life and politics of Baton
Rouge.
1
2
3
4
9
___ (13)
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g)
People have the right to refuse to sell their property to anyone
they choose, black or white.
(19)
1
2
3
4
9
73. Overall do you think that relations between blacks & whites in
Baton Rouge for the past few years are:
1.improving
2.about the same
3.getting worse
(9.missing) ___ (21)
74. Would you personally prefer to live in a neighborhood that is
l.all white
2.mostly white
3.about half white and half black
4.mostly black
5.all black
(9.missing) ___ (23)
75. Do you think that more black families will move into this
neighborhood in the next few years? l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing) ___ (25)

BACKGROUND QUESTIONS
"Now,

just a few background questions and we'll be done."

76. Are you 1. married
2. divorced
5. single?
(9.missing)
77.

3. widowed

4. separated
(27)

Last week were you 1.
3. going to school

working full time
2. part time
4. keeping house
5. something else?
(9.missing)
(29)
78. If working, do you have more than one ]ob?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing) ____(31)
79. About how much time do you spend at home during a typical weekday?
l.most of the morning
2.most of the afternoon 3.most of the day
4. not much of the day 5.
none of the day
(9.missing) ____(33)
90. How about a typical weekend?
l.most of the morning
2.most of the afternoon 3.most of the day
4. not much of the day 5.
none of the day
(9.missing) ____(35)
81. Is there usually someone around the house during the day?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing)

(37)

82. What kind of work do/did you do? ____________________________
PROBE: What is/was your job title.
IF RESPONDENT IS MARRIED:
83. What kind of work does your spouse do?
84. Which religious denomination do you most closely identify with?
1. Protestant 2. Catholic
3. Jewish 4. Other
(9.missing) ___ (39)
85. About how often do you attend religious services—
1.
almost every week
2.about once a month
3.once or twice a year
4.less often than that?
(9.missing)
(41)
86. Do you consider yourself mainly:
1. Asian
2. Black
3. Hispanic
4. White
5. Other
8. Don't know
(9.missing)
(43)
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87.

How many years of
(total years,

88.

How

89.

How many

of your children are

in private s c h o o l ? __ (51)

90.

How many

of your children are

in public s c h o o l ? __ (53)

many years of education did your spouse receive?
(total years,
including grades through HS and college)

(45-46)

(48-49)

_

education did you receive?
including grades through HS and college)

91. What happens with your children are sick or on days when the kids
don't have school and you are unable to be there?
1. R. stays at home with children 2. spouse or partner stays with them
3. relative 4. neighbor or non-relative 5. child stays home alone
6.
older brother or sister
7. organized day care program
8. other
(9.missing) _____________ (55)

_

92. If you were asked to use one offive names for
your social class,
which would you say you belong in:
I. the lower class
2. the working class 3. the middle class
4.
the upper
middle class
5.the
upper class?
(9.missing) (57)
93. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that
you are
1. pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation
2. more or less satisfied 3. not satisfied at a l l ? (9.missing) ___ (59)
94. Thinking about your life as a whole, how happy would you say you
are these days— l.very happy
2.pretty happy 3.pretty unhappy
4.very unhappy?
(9.missing)
(61)
95. Have you ever had to rely on food stamps or government assistance
to make ends meet? l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing)
(63)
96. Have others who live here ever had to rely on food stamps or
government assistance to make ends meet?
l.Yes
2.No
(9.missing) ___ (65)
97. In what year were you born?_____ 19__

(67)

98. (HAND CARD "D") Give me the number of the income group that
includes your personal annual income before taxes.
This figure
includes all of vour income— wages, salaries, interest, dividends,
(child support), and all other incomes. IFUNCERTAIN: What would
be
your best guess? (CIRCLE THE NUMBER AND ENTER THEINCOME CODE BELOW)
1. under $ 3,000 this year
2. between $ 3,001 and $ 8,000
3. between $ 8,001 and $ 12,000
4. between $ 12,001
and $ 16,000
5. between $ 16,001
and $ 20,000
6. between $ 20,001
and $ 25,000
7. between $ 25,001
and $ 30,000
8. between $ 30,001
and $ 35,000
9. between $ 35,001
and $ 45,000
10. between $ 45,000 and $ 60,000
11. more than $ 60,000
(69-70)
99. missing
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99. Please give me the number of the income group that includes your
family/household income before taxes.
This figure should include all
income— wages, salaries, interest, dividends, (child support), and all
other incomes.
IF UNCERTAIN : What would be your best guess?
1. under S 3,000 this year
2. between $ 3,001 and $ 8,000
3. between $ 8,001 and 5 12,000
4. between $ 12,001 and $ 16,000
5. between $ 16,001 and $ 20,000
6. between $ 20,001 and S 25,000
7. between 5 25,001 and $ 30,000
8. between 5 30,001 and 5 35,000
9. between $ 35,001 and $ 45,000
10. between $ 45,000 and $ 60,000
11. over $ 60,000
(72-73)
99. missing
END OF INTERVIEW
THANK RESPONDENT MANY TIMES OVER
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INTERVIEWER OBSERVATIONS
ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS YOURSELF AFTER THE INTERVIEW
100. Who did you talk to?
1. Male head of household
2. Female head of household

(75)

101. Respondent's race as you would guess it
4. Hispanic
1. White
2. Black
3. Asian

5. Other
___ (77)
102. Did you see any of the following in the respondent's home or on
its grounds? (CODE ALL THAT APPLY)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

burglar protection signs
alarms
barking dogs
many locks on the door
chain-link fence
grills on doors, windows

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
N
N
N

___ (79)
___ (1)
___ (3)
___ (5)
___ (7)
___ (9)

103. Did R have difficulty hearing the questions or understanding the
questionnaire?
1. Hearing
2. Understanding
3. Both
4. No problems ___ (11)
104. What was the respondent's initial attitude about being
interviewed?
l.very interested
2.somewhat interested
3.indifferent
___ (13)
4.somewhat reluctant
5.very reluctant
6.hard to tell
105. What was the respondent's attitude about giving both first and
last names during the interview?
1. volunteered information easily 2. somewhat reluctant, but did
not object
3. somewhat suspicious and objected at first, but then
cooperated
4. refused to give full names
5. refused to give
even first names
6. didn't refuse but I thought s/he held back
(15)
106. Was anyone else present during the interview?
1. Yes
2. No
107. Did
respondent speak with a
foreign accent?
1. Yes
2. No

(17)
(19)

108. Did
the respondent have any
obvious physical disabilities or
impairments, such as loss of limb, paralysis, facial disfigurement,
serious speech problems, palsy, or the like?
1. Yes
2. No
(21)
109. Aside from what (he/she) said in answer to the specific
questions, is it your impression that the respondent leads a very busy
and active life; that (he/she) doesn't have much to do; or that
(he/she) is about average.
1. leads active life
2. leads average life
3. inactive ___ (23)
110. How open and forthcoming do you think the respondent was about
(his/her) feelings?
1. very open
2.held back somewhat
3.held back a great deal
(25)
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111. Did you observe any signs of tension or stress in the
respondent's behavior?
l.Yes
2.No

(27)

112. Hew well kept up is the outside ofthe respondent's house and
yard/apartment building?
1. very attractive
2. well kept up
3. a bit worn down
4. very poorly kept up
(29)
113. How much activity--cars and/or people— was there on the street?
1. a great deal
2. some
3. almost none
(31)
114. Was this a ?
1. single-family detached home
2. duplex
3. 2-8 unit apartments
4. trailer
115. YARD (circle all that apply)
1 = presence of a beer can or liquor bottle
2 = other litter or trash on lawn
3 = grass uncut

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

(33)
(35)

VITA
John Collins Kilburn, Jr. was born in New Orleans,
Louisiana, on December 22, 1964.
C. Delmas.

He is married to Judith

He is the son of John C. Kilburn, Sr. and

Barbara Kilburn, both of New Orleans, Louisiana.

He

attended St. Pius X elementary school and graduated from
Jesuit High School in May, 1982.

He graduated from the

University of New Orleans in December, 1987 with a bachelor
of arts degree in sociology.
Kilburn began his graduate training at Louisiana State
University in August, 1989.

He has worked on various

research projects primarily under the supervision of Wesley
Shrum.

He received his master of arts degree in sociology

in May, 1992.
politics,

He has several publications in the areas of

family violence, and ritualistic behavior.

His

dissertation address security as a multi-level process with
a unique set of determinants for each type of action.

He

expects to receive his doctor of philosophy degree in
August of 1996.

He is currently employed as an Adjunct

Assistant Professor of Humanities at Our Lady of the Lake
College.

175

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate:

John C. Kilburn Jr.

Major Field:

Sociology

Title of Diaeertation:

Security and Rational Choice: Household, Community,
and Public Provision

Approved:

jor Professor and Chairman

le Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Date of Examination:
June 25, 1996

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

